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Abstract 
 
 A substantial volume of analysis was generated among scholars and theorists around the 
foreign policy orientation of Georgia and Ukraine. The foreign policy of these post-Soviet 
countries was determined as respective of both, external and domestic challenges at hand. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the countries’ geopolitical status quo has been 
challenged, and broader opportunities for the newly independent states have come to exist. The 
relevance of countries’ domestic strategy and the outcome of foreign policy is the spotlight of 
this research. 
 This study makes an effort to fill the gap in social science literature about foreign policy 
orientation change in transitional democratic, post-Soviet countries-Ukraine and Georgia.   These 
are countries that have aspired to the same geopolitical goal but because of significant external 
and domestic challenges were prone not to the same consequences in foreign policy.  Ukraine, 
with its weak and corrupt state institutions, mostly pro-Russian political class, economic and 
energy dependence on Russia, can be considered as a case more likely to change geopolitical 
orientation. At the same time Georgia, weak and once dependent on external power but, with a 
mostly different type of development, recently altered its pro-Western government on a new, 
with a declared conformist policy concerning Russia, but it still has not deviated from the 
chosen, Western path. 
     The thesis attempt to define what affects the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine and 
Georgia after Color Revolutions. The paper tries to answer the following questions: Why the 
change occurred in Ukraine but not in Georgia? What made Ukraine swing like a pendulum in 
foreign policy and Georgia-remain relatively stable? Which domestic political factors were 
decisive for the foreign policy change in Ukraine and is keeping Georgia on the chosen path? 
How did domestic politics contribute to the foreign policy change?  
     This comparative case study of Ukraine and Georgia considers domestic political factors 
after two Color-Revolutions in Ukraine (2004) and Georgia (2003);   
     The expected core idea of this thesis studies particular factors that affect foreign policy 
orientation of chosen countries. With comparative analyses, there is an attempt to enrich the 
foreign policy change phenomena of dependent states and assess its probability 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 
 Small or big, but mostly weak post-Soviet states are inclined to pursue a cautious 
bandwagoning policy towards its external hegemony, Russia. The difference in resources made 
former Soviet republics remain entailed politically or economically to the dominant neighbor. 
Except for the Baltic states, only Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are in relatively open and 
vigorous attempts to build independent, democratic institutions, to conduct independent foreign 
policy, and to escape the Russian sphere of influence. These three countries are participants in 
the Eastern Partnership Program with the EU and have committed themselves to the EU 
standards and values (Kakachia K. 2014). Nevertheless, this study focuses on Ukraine and 
Georgia because of important criteria allows developing of better outcome-centric comparative 
research. First of all, only in Ukraine and Georgia Color Revolution happened which are 
perceived as starting points to significant changes in domestic and foreign policy. Second, 
advanced research revealed that the political turmoil in Moldova since 2009 makes it difficult to 
find the relevance with Ukraine and Georgia (Freedom House, 2013). In the beginning, the cases 
of Ukraine and Georgia are mostly similar. Further analysis of particular political features allows 
revealing more vivid dichotomous. It has to be mentioned that there was one more Color 
revolution in another post-Soviet country, Kirgizstan. Two attempts to become more democratic 
failed, and the semi-authoritarian Kyrgyzstan continues development without substantial 
transformation (FH, country report, Kyrgyzstan 2015). 
 The Rose Revolution in November 2003 and the Orange Revolution in November 2004 
ushered in a new era for Ukraine and Georgia. Pro-Western political parties rose to power. Both 
countries appeared in the heart of international attention. The explanation of why politics in 
Ukraine and Georgia are important lies in the hegemonic traits and menace capacity of Russia. 
More precisely, color revolution encouraged by the West threatened Russia. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin many times complained that Color revolutions were the attempt to undermine 
Russia’s status in a former Soviet territory. The attitude of Russia started to convert into the new 
difficulties. (Tsygankov 2015). 
 Rising tensions with Russia attracted international interest towards Ukraine and Georgia. 
The West started to recognize the importance of the sovereignty and stability of these countries 
as frontiers or gateways to Europe. Especially after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, The 
West openly declared concerns regarding rising Russian influence in the region (UN, security 
council, 2017).  
 In 2013, when the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych postponed signing the 
Association agreement with the EU, the country and the world faced the significant foreign 
policy change. Ukraine as a non-Baltic country ranked Free 2006-2009, has a large territory and 
population, rich in natural resources but fails to resist the Russian pressure. Meanwhile, a failed 
state at the moment of Rose Revolution, small Georgia is  Partly Free democracy in transit 
(Freedom House, 2015); experienced the economic embargo and a profound war with Russia, 
lost 20% of its territories, faced implicit Western support, and even more, the strategic partner 
the US's President  administration in 2009 downgraded security ties with Georgia after initiating 
the “reset” policy with Russia. However, Georgia remained fundamentally unaltered in foreign 
policy behavior (Kakachia K. 2013:127). Foreign policy change happens when alliances 
disintegrate, the international system is affected by dramatic events, or new governments come 
to the office and start immediate alteration of policy. Also, foreign policy change requires strong 
legitimacy and bureaucratic support (Herman 1990). Ukraine is not the case suitable to this 
concept. In its turn, Georgia breaks Waltzian and other nonrealistic explanations of dependent, 
weak state behavior. 
     Where is the explanation for different foreign policy behaviors of two countries? Modern 
theories about foreign policy change tend to analyze domestic political factors. There are a lot of 
factors that occur domestically and affect foreign policy. In the case of Georgia and Ukraine, for 
example, the identity, culture, energy policy, and Russian pressure are already broadly 
scholarly discussed. As energy dependence remains the crucial factor until 2014 for the reason of 
its decisiveness, this study cannot avoid discussing it. Dependent energy policy is bound to 
corruption as the most troublesome weakness and incompetence of any government. Corruption 
undermines the prospect of economic development. Politicians, decision-makers are responsible 
for corrupt institutions, ineffective energy policy, and all consequences. The paper is going make 
finding that with a corrupt and Soviet-minded government the probability of remaining 
dependent on the external power is much bigger and vice versa. This inquiry is important 
because despite achievement and advantages both countries Ukraine and Georgia are developing 
democracies in transit. It makes them still vulnerable before the Influence of Russia. On the one 
hand, the significant difference in territorial, population, military, natural and other resources 
keep the threat permanent. Thus, the probability of reverse or change in foreign policy is still 
high.  
     The first part of this paper discusses relevant theoretical literature. There are prominent 
theories that are applicable or contradicting to Ukrainian and Georgian foreign policy change 
framework. Other concepts are appropriate to attach to chosen independent variables, IVs- 
domestic political factors of the change in Ukraine, and conversely, continuity (Gvalia et al. 
2014) of foreign course in Georgia. 
    The second part of the study, methodology creates the bridge between theories and empirical 
analyses and attempts to verify coherence in the topic’s development, explains the choice of 
method, and sets limits for the entire research framework. 
    The empirical part endeavors to cover all primary aspects and cite analyses around politics in 
Ukraine and Georgia 2004-2014. The sources of empirical data are media, articles, international 
indexes, and national statistics. 
    The aim of this research is to set out arguments consider to foreign policy change reasons in 
post-Soviet democracies that are challenged by the hegemonic interest of external power Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Part I-Theoretical framework  
 
 
1.1. Conceptualization of DV- Why foreign policy may be changed  
 
 
 Starting to study the concept of foreign policy change, first of all, we should understand 
what foreign policy is and how to analyze it. Next, we will look at how the fundamental theory 
predicts and explains the dynamic of the decision-making and change in the Foreign Policy 
       To generalize scholarly notion of the Foreign Policy mostly is acknowledged as a set of 
goals, directives, and intentions directed at some actor or condition outside of the state that 
affects a target in the manner desired by policymakers (Gustavsson 1999: 5). 
     First of all, we should define who is the policymaker: is it the government and does it act 
solely or any internal or external factors also contribute to the decision-making process?  
      
     
1.1.1.    Actor-specific theory  
 
  
        Hudson (2005) as one of the prominent promoters of the actor-specific theory relies on the 
conceptualization of “actor” – personality or group of people and consider such approach more 
feasible than a development of theory around cultural factors, social or state behavior effects in 
foreign policy. Hudson believes that the better Foreign Policy analyses should be done from the 
rational, empirical study. In this regard, Hudson refers Simon: ‘‘It is far easier to calculate the 
rational response to a fully specified situation than it is to arrive at a reasonable specification of 
the position. Without empirical study, it is less relevant to predict which of many specifications 
actors will adopt" (ibid:4).  
        Whether the foreign policy is shaped by internal and external factors, Hudson (ibid) alludes 
to Rosenau who advocates using the model of prominent genetic scientist Gregor Mendel to 
discern genotype from phenotype in plants as the pattern for making foreign policy analysis. 
Rosenau offers the explanation of foreign policy interaction through careful observation of 
genotype of the nation-state. Rosenau also was encouraging the development of actor-specific 
theory. Rosenau felt that the best way to create the proper argument about foreign policy change 
is the aggregation of statistics and confirmation with the relevant information at several levels of 
analysis from individual leaders to the international system.  
 As Hudson acknowledges (Ibid:14) the development of Foreign policy analyses theory 
and comparative methodological approach makes more room for more progressive 
methodological preferences, distinct from contemporary mainstream tendencies in International 
Relations theory. 
        Countries, events, and principal actors could be conceptualized along the time with a 
comparative empirical testing method. Mostly in comparison, not in the case study, it would be 
better to understand what instruments of statecraft (e.g., diplomatic, military, economics, and so 
on) were used in the foreign policy decision-making process.  
 Another object of interest is the level of commitment of decision-makers. Hudson 
proposes to compare independent variables along behavioral dimensions whether the positive or 
an adverse effect has been displayed and aggregate patterns by which these independent 
variables were correlated with foreign policy behavior (ibid 2005).  
        Decision-maker in foreign policy is a person or a group of individuals with the sophisticated 
understanding of event - “the tangible artifact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy, 
alternatively viewed as ‘‘who does what to whom, how’’ in international affairs” (ibid:9). People 
are dependent on particular beliefs, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, 
and self-conceptions. Hudson calls the decision maker's mind a microcosm, created by the 
culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and 
innumerable other factors.  Scientifically exploring how this complicated context shapes the 
decision-making process is crucial for Hudson (Ibid).  
        In Hudson’s view the particular conditions of high stress, high uncertainty, under which the 
dominant position of the head of state is making the decision requires attention; It is important to 
know what personal characteristics and individual qualities affect foreign policy choice. Hudson 
thinks that the close examination of political leadership explains a lot in foreign policy.  
        Actor-specific theory in the view of Hudson elucidates the role of national political culture, 
how the nation perceives itself on the international arena. This perception is generated by the 
societal character, a product of the country’s socialization process. Culture might have an effect 
on cognition of decision-maker and based on this might have influence on institutions and 
bureaucracies. 
       
    The actor-specific theory of foreign policy analyses arranges theoretical and methodological 
foundation for an analytical understanding of decision-making process in the foreign policy and 
better explanation of change phenomena. The understanding of “change” in the foreign policy 
includes different typologies of alteration of a nation’s patterns of external relations. Typologies 
of change vary from the simple goal change or policy restructuring to full reorientation or even 
isolation.  
 
1.1.2. Theory of full redirection  
 
     Herman (1990) stipulates an understanding of FP as a goal-oriented or problem-oriented 
program designed to address some problem that entails some action towards the foreign entity. 
The state uses different instruments and creates difficult conditions if the nation changes its 
international orientation. Thus, if the country deals with the most extreme form of the change i.e. 
a complete redirection of the actor’s orientation toward the world internal difficulties mostly 
occur. In contrast, lesser forms of change concern whether a state is shifting its approach just 
toward one international issue (Hermann 1990). 
     Changes in foreign policy are not always for the better. The empirical framework created 
by the real decisions of people and institutions makes understanding of consequences 
challenging and poses challenging theoretical problems as for scholars so for policy makers.  
     Changes that mark a reversal or, at least, a profound redirection of a country's foreign 
policy are the area of the particular interest because of the demands their adoption poses on the 
initiating government and its internal constituents and because of their potentially powerful 
consequences for other countries.  
      Herman (Ibid) makes references to the distinction between foreign policy redirection that 
results from regime change or state transformation, and change that occurs when the existing 
government elects to move in a different policy direction (Hermann 1990). The probability of 
fundamental redirection of foreign orientation increases when there is a full alteration of power.   
     Herman in his essay also examines the role of an actor in the system where the change 
happens. He names it as a self-corrected change when the existing government elects to move in 
a different policy direction. Herman cites Hereclitus that “we cannot step into the same stream 
twice”(ibid:5) and considers that fundamental redirections in a country's foreign policy that 
happens with the following challenges:  
 “(1) Adjustment Changes. Changes occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and the 
scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done, and 
the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.    
 (2) Program Changes. Changes are made in the methods or means by which the goal or 
problem is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative, program 
changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft (such as the pursuit of a goal 
through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force). What is done and how it is done 
changes, but the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.    
 (3) Problem/Goal Changes. The initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is 
replaced or simply forfeited. In this foreign policy change, the purposes them-   selves are 
replaced.   
  (4) International Orientation Changes. The most extreme form of foreign policy change 
involves the redirection of the actor's entire orientation toward world affairs. In contrast to 
smaller forms of change that concern the actor's approach to a single issue or particular set of 
other actors, orientation change involves a fundamental shift in the actor's international role and 
activities. Not one policy but many are more or less   simultaneously changed” (Hermann 
1990:5)  
     International Orientation Change concerns the actor’s approach and requires a 
fundamental shift in the actor’s/state’s international position and goals. International orientation 
change entails a simultaneous change of many policy directions (Ibid). 
      Herman uses Goldman’s scheme of three dimensions that influence to which extent 
foreign policy is likely may change. According to the scheme the degree of institutionalization 
and commitment of the government; also, level of support of various actors of domestic politics 
and degree of salience of issue shapes the character of change.  
    Moreover, Hermann discusses some “meta-regulators” or sources-powerful political or social 
forces that are capable of setting the agenda for the primary decision-makers (Ibid:11):  
1. “A leader driven,  
2.    bureaucratic advocacy,  
3.    domestic restructuring   
4.    and external shock. “ 
     There can be some intertwine and interaction between them. The external shock 
influences other three more.  Understanding of this pattern helps to integrate theoretical 
explanation and allows a broader interpretation of change.  
     Observing various cases of change Herman assumes that mostly it occurs in the result of 
failure. Disadvantage and critical experience encourages the person or the group of individuals to 
restructure their mind or the model of attitude.  
     Hermann (ibid) refers to Holsti’s eight different case study of change and almost repeats 
Hudson’s   actor-specific theory that decision-making process is another strong factor that 
powerfully influences to those regimes, which redirects foreign policy dramatically. 
     Alongside the substantial personal factor, Herman places stress on the high capability of 
resistance from different structures of government or society. It is paramount to have engaged 
key individuals with relevant knowledge and significant organizational constraints. Herman 
argues that just as the range of change can be great so too can the resistance from the various 
elements of the government or other groups be strong.   
     And finally, leader driven change requires a presence of authoritative policy-maker, the 
powerful head of government who is capable successfully install his vision. (Herman 1990) . 
 
1.2.3. Factors of Simultaneous Change  
  
    One more foreign policy change scientist Jakob Gustavsson represents analytical framework 
how to study “change” phenomena. Gustavsson (1999) examined six different foreign policy 
change cases by the end of the Cold War. Before it most of the analysts inclined to ignore 
transition process and focused on “normative bias for stability.” Thus, the change was 
overlooked for a long time.  
        A significant difference in other authors’ approaches occurs when there is a distinction in 
the length of being in power. Who changes politics-the incumbent or the new authority, matters 
for Gustavsson. According to the actor-specific definition of foreign policy, mentioned above, 
the government is the sole practitioner of foreign policy, and it behaves purposefully. First, they 
identify background, then motivation as a cognitive factor and at last they discuss the outcome. 
Here Gustavsson came across that previous authors just provided analytical tools for empirical 
study and did not admit that other factors may also have a significant role in change. Even more, 
Gustavsson criticizes Holsti who identifies only independent variables, such as internal or 
external factors but misses intervening factors-perception, personality, elite, etc. From the 
Gustavsson’s critical point of view, the relationship between two sets of factors is crucial.  
    Gustavsson proposes the alternative model of foreign policy change analyses. In this model, 
there are number of ‘’sources’’ of change that interact with ‘’decision-makers’’ during 
‘’decision-making process’’. The structure of this interaction relies on a domestic and 
international level. The author establishes subcategories on domestic level-political and 
economic factors. On an international arena, such subcategories also are military and security 
forces.    
        On the domestic level, the political factors involve political parties, and voters support, 
opinion polls, coalitions, etc. The economic factors include Gross Domestic Product(GDP) 
growth, inflation rate, the level of unemployment, etc. Then comes cognitive factor, in other 
words examining of human beings individual or the group, that are decision-makers.  
    Next is decision-making process, where some key, experienced people work within 
established institutional and bureaucratic structure to bring about the change in foreign policy.  
The strategy of decision-making is meant to pursue and manipulate others into accepting a new 
political orientation.  
     Deciding when a foreign policy change is an “improvement,” something positive or even 
a progressive it can be compares with reforms that need ‘’policy window’’ or when ‘’the stars 
are in the right position for a rocket launch’’. Gustavsson (Ibid) here uses R. Kingdon’s 
formulation. According to this analysis the “policy entrepreneur’’ e.g. policy-maker waits for a 
moment to put his proposal on the political agenda. Policy windows open and close and it 
requires a quick step.  
    “The individual who interprets the sources of change and then acts within the decision-making 
process corresponds to the idea of a policy entrepreneur who capitalizes on a shift on the political 
conditions and manages to launch a favorite political proposal.’’ (ibid:86). After placing 
“reforms” on the political agenda successful decision-maker manipulates colleagues and 
proceeds to achieving the desired outcome.  
    Gustavsson summarizes that not any described elements have the analytical priority over the 
other. The source of change is located both on domestic as well as the international level, 
cognitive element e.g. decision-maker and his mindset are critical for better understanding 
foreign policy shifts, and finally, it shows the importance of crises acknowledgment that is 
generated from the domestic political reforms. (Gustavsson 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1.2. Conceptualization of IV-factors that affect foreign policy change  
 
 
1.2.1. Dependency theory 
 
        According to prominent theories, a small or weak state tends to alter its foreign policy under 
the pressure of the regional hegemony-super-power (Hermann 1990, Gustavsson 1999, Hudson 
2005). Moreover, Hermann (ibid) explains the difference between internal or external factors, 
which influence on a government’s decision-making for foreign policy change and undoubtedly 
recognizes the privilege of the external power. For Moon (1985) the tendency, when the weak 
states significantly determine its foreign policy by external power interest is the conventional 
wisdom.  
    Moon supports this theory by the case when the weak, third world nations that are depending 
on the United States [e.g. superpower, external power, dominant, core] through trade or aid are 
likely to vote with the pattern that resembles the voting of the US. The preferences of dominant 
superpower make weaker states abandon their inclinations on foreign policy and seek approval 
of superpower. Weak states anticipate the reward or punishment according to the level of 
compliance, argues Moon (ibid). 
     Moon’s theory explains the behaviors of both, the dominant and the dependent states in an 
asymmetrical dyad. There is a direct correlation between superpower’s aid and dependent state’s 
foreign policy compliance. The character and level of compliance or in other words the change in 
foreign policy is largely determined outside of the weak state. If economic and social ties 
between two nations, weak or dominant, implies the sharing interest thus the observed agreement 
between them may be the result of consensus, not compliance. 
    Moon tries to make the assumptions about decision-making process clearer for both kinds of 
states. The superpower must have preferences about the foreign-policy behavior of weak states 
for justification of expenditures in the further financial or diplomatic aid. Also, the dominant 
state must have flexible “conditioning tools” (:299) –rewords or punishment to calibrate the 
degree of compliance of the weak state. The same model of assumption suits to the weak state. 
These parallel patterns confirm that the decision-making process in foreign policy change is very 
simple and goes according to the bargaining model (:302)  
     Albeit, there is one fundamental defining characteristic among the assumptions of the 
weak state-domestic constraints. It is, in general, true that if the weak state is not a democratic, 
developed and politically open nation, so there are fewer constraints from the bureaucracy or 
other competitive political or societal structures. It seems that the constraints, pressure, and 
limitations they face, are in some ways less severe than those, in stable constitutional 
democracies. But, Moon deems that foreign policy depends less on the democratic process. 
Moreover, the Third World weak states leaders are in a considerably precarious position than 
democratically elected ones; they have more to lose. Such leaders spend more of their time and 
resources trying to remain in power; they may face military or other coups.  Thus, the weak state 
leader more than in the developed world is very sensitive towards any controversial political 
issues because it anticipates a significant foreign influence. 
    In the bargaining model, the aid does not mean only the form of reward. The trade, defense 
treaties and investment are the element of exchange as well. But, as Moon describes in the case 
of dependence on the US it is very unlikely that the trade, defense deals, and investment are the 
flexible and efficient “conditioning tools” because the American government is not able to 
manipulate them for political purposes. The trade, defense treaties, and investment are non-
governmental spheres in the US. So, in Moon’s theory, mostly the aid is the external political 
tool, the controlled variable for foreign policy change that calibrates the level of compliance. 
(:304)     
    Furthermore, mostly expectations suggest that the foreign policy will be markedly stable 
within a one ruling regime and quite variable at the moment of regime change.  According to the 
Moon’s study when a significant regime change occurs the change in foreign aid is relatively 
notable. But in the absence of major change, there should be little change in the foreign aid 
(Moon 1985). 
 
 
 1.2.2. Pro-core and anti-core theory 
 
    Whether Moon perceives the bargaining model in foreign policy dependence as the 
cooperation without coercion, the Moon’s critiques argue that dependent foreign policy change 
reveals that the weak state policy more reflects the interest of global powers than of their national 
governments (Hey 1993). 
    Jeanne Hay says that the benefit of cooperation, for both, compliance or consensus models, 
tends to correspond to the preferences of the superpower. The compliant condition of the 
dependent foreign policy, as the example of political realism, shows that Third World states, 
lacking in the economic and military resources-continuance of power in the global system, 
comply with hegemonic powers' wishes because to do otherwise would follow by financial or 
military sanctions. Hay cites Richardson: “The compliance is a sacrifice, wherein actors abandon 
their preferences as they conform to another's dissimilar foreign policy wishes” (ibid:546).  
    Hay perceives the compliance as the response to the pressure, threats or promises from the 
superpower-core state. She emphasizes that the pressure and the reaction may be hidden.  For 
instance, the US placed particular demands on Latin American debtors for the restructuring of 
the foreign debt. The author thinks that these policy decisions increase the gain of the United 
States even though they may develop solely in response to an economic crisis, rather than to 
implicit or explicit threats.  (Ibid:546) 
    However, Hay agrees with Moon and recognizes that the compliance leads to the foreign 
policy change but it is a cooperative rather than coercive decision. The compliance and 
consensus are the collaborative and mutually beneficial ways of alignment among leaders of 
periphery-weak state and core-superpower. Hay criticizes the bargaining model, as an entirely 
different one from the compliance model, which explains any particular compliant behavior as a 
form of payment for a specific economically dependent relationship only in an isolated period.  
Hay disagrees with Richardson, Kegley and other compliance theorists who describe the foreign 
policy agreement process as antagonistic (Ibid:548). 
     In the same study, Hay discusses a counter dependent political strategy with its adverse 
effect. Under the counter dependence, the adverse economic consequences of long time 
dependence generate negative foreign policy towards the core state. Hay mentions Biddle and 
Stephens's examination of Jamaica's foreign policy under Michael Manley. Because of Jamaica's 
economic dependence, the USA was able to force Jamaica to adopt a development plan that 
brought uneven economic growth, an inequitable distribution of wealth, escalated levels of 
unemployment and increased poverty for the poorest Jamaicans. Frustrated with such conditions, 
popular sectors in 1972 elected Michael Manley, a Democratic socialist had "a discernible 
current feeling" towards external power the US government. Manley supported antagonistic 
policy to the Western powers. Jamaica as the dependent state generated a foreign policy reaction 
directly opposite to that desired by the USA. The key defining element of a counter dependent 
foreign policy is the personal negative opinion of the country’s leader. (Ibid:550) 
    Furthermore, Hay discusses the Foreign policy independence theory, as another explanatory of 
foreign policy change. While economic dependence is certainly a fundamental criterion for the 
dependent state's foreign policy strategy, there are also other specific foreign policy 
determinants. For example, pressure from the local interest groups, a leader's personal style, and 
interactions among dependent states or historical foreign policy precedents. All these variables 
play a crucial role outside of the dependency's dynamics in depended state and create the room 
for an independent foreign policy as well. Possible examples of the independent foreign policy 
include treaties of friendship or cooperation, diplomatic visits, and policies advocating universal 
principles such as human rights or environmental protection. An independent foreign policy may 
appear either pro-core or anti-core; the content and the outcome are less important than the 
context. The independent foreign policy is not one, which seeks to establish an independence 
from the core but is a direct response to dependence, almost the same as the counter-dependency 
is.  
    In summary, Hay discusses five dependent foreign policy classifications with different foreign 
policy outcomes: 
1. “Compliance exhibits a pro-core outcome which develops against the wishes of the       Latin 
American policy makers. Compliance entails a sacrifice in which the leaders' preferences are 
abandoned for a pro-core policy.       
2.    Consensus also exhibits pro-core behavior but conforms with the preferences of the Latin 
American policy makers. Both counter dependence and compensation display anti-USA 
behavior.  
3.    A policy maker who believes economic dependence is injurious to local development 
generates counter dependent foreign policies to sever dependent ties.  
4.    Compensation, on the other hand, is implemented by policy makers who themselves are 
comfortable with dependence. They develop anti-core policies to mollify domestic opposition to 
dependence.  
5.    Finally, independent foreign policies may be pro-core or anti-core. Their defining element is 
that they do not develop in response to the country's dependent situation. (:552) 
    These five types all assume that foreign policy is essentially under the control of the executive. 
The difference arises when the executives can implement their preferences. And if not, it is 
paramount to whom they acquiesce.  In much of Latin America, the most foreign policy remains 
under the presidential control. In Ecuador specifically, foreign policy is constitutionally entrusted 
to the executive alone. (Hey 1993:546-553)  
 
 
 
1.2.3. Domestic political theory 
 
     Many studies in International Relations or Comparative Politics fields prove that 
domestic politics is typically a crucial part of the explanation for foreign policy choice.  
    A theory of foreign policy tends to explain why particular states make special foreign policy 
moves at particular times.  The foreign policy theory is not the International relation’s theory. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that unlike of IR theory foreign policy is determined by hundreds of 
variable and idiosyncratic factors that lie outside the IR theory. IR theory does not tell us “why 
state X made a certain move last Tuesday” (1979, p. 121). In contrast, a theory of foreign policy 
would explain why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways. Differences in 
behavior arise from differences in the internal political and social characteristics. Foreign 
policies are governmental products. A theory has to take the performance of governments as its 
object of explanation to be called a theory of foreign policy (Waltz K. 1996). 
    Fearon attempts to answer the question how, exactly, does domestic politics shape foreign 
policy. Fearon repeats the Waltzian evolutionary approach that the states are unitary, rational 
actors and the change in foreign policy is the best adaptive way to survive in the international 
system (Fearon 1998). But what is domestic politics?  
    If a large state tries to please neighbors, imposes the optimal trading tariffs and strengthens the 
national interest, this is a standard foreign policy. However, if the state practices protectionist 
politics when importers should be buying protection through campaign contributions to office-
seeking politicians, then this is the proper domestic-political explanation of foreign policy.  
    Domestic policy can matter for foreign policy either by causing states to pursue suboptimal 
foreign policies, or when political institutions, cultures, economic creates differences in states, or 
leadership goals unrelated to public interest are causally relevant to explaining different foreign 
policy choices  
    Internal political explanations of foreign policy give the impression that various independent 
variables can do this. For instance, the state structure-weak or strong, political system, economic 
characteristics, protectionism in trade policy, the nature of electoral system, number or 
‘’vetoes’’, domestic institutions, public opinion, etc.  Moreover, a growing literature 
shows how leaders manipulate with information or political position and using this adventurism 
tactic for the sake to remain in power rather than serve to public interest in the foreign policy. 
Therefore, in some cases, the state doesn’t act as a unitary and rational actor but chooses 
suboptimal foreign policies due to domestic political interactions. In the result average voters, 
ordinary citizens or even policy makers can be injured.  
(Fearon 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II-Methodology 
 
2.1. Research subject and goal   
     
    
  The purpose of this paper is to reveal the reasons of profound and fundamental foreign 
policy change (Hudson 2005) or the international orientation change (Herman 1990) that happen 
in difficult decision-making circumstances.  Sometimes the change creates a challenging task for 
the nation or vice versa, in the case of refraining from it the country avoids the limitation of 
sovereignty. The goal of this research is to study domestic factors of full redirection in a foreign 
policy of Ukraine and continuity in case of Georgia.  
    It has been considered that the radical changes in foreign policy takes place when the 
fundamental shaking processes happen in the world. For instance, after the end of the Cold War 
many states chose to make a radical change in their foreign policy orientations. According to 
another common theory, a small state tends to alter its foreign policy under the influence of the 
regional hegemony-super-power (Hermann 1990, Gustavsson 1999, Hudson 2005) The cases of 
Ukraine and Georgia are developing under the pressure of the same external power Russia, but 
without fundamental shaking factors on an international arena. If taking in account that the 
Russia as the regional hegemony has the same dominant interest to the former colonies, attempts 
to keep the influence and disturb their Western aspiration, we can perceive Russia as the external 
factor that keeps neighbors under the permanent threat of shock  (Oskanian 2016). 
     The vast majority of modern literature shows that researchers use almost the similar 
pattern of analyses in foreign policy change, relying on actor-specific theory and considering the 
role of external and domestic factors on the same level.  
     This study relies on the actor-specific theory as to the most relevant to the concrete, 
contextual, sophisticated analysis about foreign policy change reasons about post Color 
revolutions Ukraine and Georgia. Variables examined in this paper are expected to be non-
quantifiable. The comparison of empirical data with the analysis of the existing literature and 
contemporary media will shed the light on crucial differences in the domestic political trends of 
Ukraine and Georgia.       
      
 
2.2. Research question and method  
     
 Based on the empirical analysis and theoretical framework of foreign policy change the 
following research question emerges: How particular domestic political factors, like corruption, 
the character of the political elite, also, energy policy and economic reforms together the factors 
that affect foreign policy orientation of Ukraine and Georgia?  
    Examining similar characteristics of Ukraine and Georgia it has to be considered that both 
they are:  weak and developing democracies, former colonies of Russia and have the lack of 
natural resources in relative disadvantage compared to Russia, both are aspired to the West, are 
participants of the EU Eastern partnership program (FH 2015, Balmaceda 2013, Aslund 2014). 
Furthermore, here we can apply the scholarly highlighted conclusion that weak states, in general, 
are unable to govern their foreign policy (Herman 1990, pg. 4). Moreover, Ukraine and Georgia 
as former colonies, are experience the similar hegemonic influence of neighboring Russia and 
may be punished for independent foreign political decisions.  The Russian government was in 
the same way dissatisfied with the Western engagement of Ukraine and Georgia. The foreign 
minister of Russia announced that he is discontented with Georgia’s, as well as Ukraine’s, desire 
to become a NATO member and if they do, it will be followed by a “negative geopolitical shift” 
(German 2009: 226).  
  James Rosenau, the pioneer of Comparative Foreign Policy change analyst, was 
challenged to build a cross-national and multilevel theory of foreign policy and to subject the 
theory to rigorous comparative empirical testing of circumstances that significantly change state 
foreign policies (Rosenau 1966). Hudson refers Rosenau and sets out the domestic political 
factors as the genotype of a particular state that affects the phenotype-foreign policy (Hudson 
2005:6). Comparative Foreign Policy researchers proposed to view the Foreign Policy genealogy 
as the artifact or ‘’event’’ that describes ‘‘who does what to whom, and how’’ in international 
affairs. In other words, the causality of the change is laid down in domestic politics, and the 
government/political class can influence the decision-making (Hudson 2005:9, Herman 1990:11, 
Gustavsson 1999:84). Understanding of the common picture how the external “shock” or factor - 
Russia influenced the foreign policy of Ukraine and Georgia, allows us not to give a separate, 
comprehensive study of this phenomena. Russia is an external factor that exists permanently and 
as hegemony has the same interest-dominate neighbors.  The difference starts with the state’s 
reaction regarding the foreign influence. Foreign policy change researchers believe that the 
correct empirical explanation of the domestic politics is not always easy.  Just as it is to describe 
how real factors, agents or actors affect each other (Gustavsson 1999).  
 Ukraine and Georgia are almost similarly free, mostly partly free , and freer than other 
former Soviet countries, except the Baltic States and Moldova. Georgia is less corrupt than 
Ukraine which in its turn is as corrupt as the authoritarian post-Soviet countries. Georgia is less 
dependent economically on Russia than Ukraine. Georgia has got rid of the energy dependence 
of Russia. Because of corrupt, ineffective bureaucracy and state institutions Ukraine remained 
dependent on Russia till the Maidan events, 2014 that happened consequently to the foreign 
policy change. (Aslund, A: Kindle Locations 418-422). 
 Based on this, the hypothesis of this research paper is following: despite the similar 
Western aspiration and the same external challenges the dichotomous of the domestic political 
idiosyncrasy of two post-Color revolution countries’ leads to the different foreign policy 
outcome. Thus, the comparative method is the best way of operationalization.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Operationalization of DV 
     
     As the interest of this paper is the fundamental course redirection, we have to pay 
attention to the fact that International reorientation involves dramatic changes in both words and 
deeds in multiple issue areas on the actor's relationship with external entities. Typically, 
redirection means that the country replaces allies (Volgy T. Shwartz 1991). 
     The plethora of media and scholarly articles are discussing the foreign policy change-
rejection to sign the AA with the EU by the government od V. Yanukovych and continuity of 
Georgian foreign policy. As Gustavsson said, the change in country’s foreign policy mostly 
happens simultaneously e.g. when there are some trends of changes as it was after the end of the 
Cold War. In case of Ukraine and Georgia despite to the similar start the change happened only 
in Ukraine (Gustavsson 1999).    
     Nevertheless, Herman sees the foreign policy change as the authoritative decision 
directed to the hegemonic external political entity that mostly occurs in the result of domestic 
failure (Herman 1990:5-13). Foreign policy redirection of Ukraine can be considered as the 
consequence of the failure of the incumbent government, that tend to behave more authoritarian 
(Aslund 2015). Moreover, Ukrainian case reflects the idea when the change happens because the 
leader is looking for a way to increase political power and survive in politics, despite the 
domestic policy challenges (Doeser 2011:224). Whereas Georgia challenges prominent Waltzian 
theory about Cautious behavior of the state as a rational actor who seeks to survive via balanced 
foreign policy. Georgian choice contradicts with the dependent model of Moon as well.   
 
 
   
 
 
2.4. Operationalization of IV 
 
 
 The challenges on the national level are the factors that affect foreign policy decision in 
Ukraine and Georgia. According to actor-specific theorists, the best explanation of the foreign 
policy change are domestic politics, economics, and decision-makers (Herman 1990, Hudson 
2005, Gustavsson 1999). In the case of Ukraine and Georgia corruption, political elite and 
economic and energy policy specifications are the salient factors.  
 A theory about foreign policy is a theory at the national level, and it can tell us what 
international conditions the domestic policies have to cope with (Waltz K. 1979:72) 
 What one might want to do in the absence of structural constraints is different from what one is 
encouraged to do in their presence. States do not willingly place themselves in situations of 
increased dependence (Ibid:120). Domestic politics of Ukraine contradicts to the neo-realistic 
approach. Ukraine as an independent state was not able to create conditions of trade with much 
more concern to its trading partners than to itself. Constructivist approach implies more to 
Ukraine. For instance, energy policy can be related to cultural and foreign policy orientations. 
Those states that are more pro-Russian can have more pro-Russian, less diversified energy 
policy, and those with the pro-Western foreign policy do more to foster energy diversification. 
Moreover, Energy and economic dependence on Russia creates the incentive for overwhelming 
corruption in Ukraine but non-dependence policy saves Georgia (Balmaceda 2013, Aslund 
2013). The elite of dependent state got fear on the one hand not to disturb hegemony, loose the 
economic support and consequently be defeated in elections. On the other hand, any economic 
crisis could cause a coup or regime-change (Miller E. 2006) When economic dependence on the 
hegemonic external power is too high balancing and conducting of independent foreign policy 
becomes both difficult and costly (Papayoanou P. 1997). Thus, dependent domestic politics of 
Ukraine indicates more pro Hegemonic stance, whereas Georgia tries to keep relative 
independence. Economic dependence more impacts the foreign policy of dependent state than 
the independent one.  
     Ukraine is the state that relates to the domestic political theories about dependent states 
that are under the threat of punishment from the dominant neighbor, domestic politics cultivates 
the soil, and foreign policy of Ukraine reflects more the interest of Russia and the leader spends a 
lot of resources to stay in power (Moon 1985). Ukraine is economically and politically damaged 
because of dependent relationships. While Georgia successfully tried to establish “anti-core” and 
“counter-dependent” (Hey, 1993:549-552) foreign policy and placed itself relatively far from 
Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. Limitations and data 
 
     This study agrees to the several theoretical approaches that it would be better to shift 
attention to actor-decision-maker, economy and other domestic political factors rather than to 
keep a bird’s eye view with the analysis of political culture or psychological/behavioristic 
approach (Gustavsson1999; Rosenau 1966). Another theory layouts the task to foreign policy 
change researchers to determine what failure triggers the change. (Herman 1990). There is 
scholarly argued that the productive decision-making process is the result of mature and 
developed state institutions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Institutions in Ukraine for the 
moment of change were fragile, and the change would ultimately undermine them (Aslund, A. 
2015: Kindle Locations 2407-2408). Furthermore, the right and effective institutions can explain 
the level of success in post-authoritarian societies (Di Palma, 1990). The case of Georgia is 
considered as one of the most important reform prototypes among Poland in 1989 (Balcerowicz 
2014), Czechoslovakia in 1990 (Klaus 2014), Estonia in 1992 (Laar 2014), Latvia and Lithuania 
in 2009 for Ukraine. (Aslund, A. 2014).  
     The framework of this study is limited by the concrete IVs. Corruption and anti-
corruption policy is recognized as the striking domestic factor vigorously discussed in media and 
by the researchers. Corruption is accurately measured by the Transparency International and 
indicates the apparent dichotomy between Georgia and Ukraine. Decision-makers are broadly 
discussed in the relevant literature. As for energy policy, sovereignty of Ukraine was 
significantly limited with dependence on Russia and vice versa, independence of Georgia 
increased with the cut of gas supply, 2007 from Russia (Balmaceda, M. M. 2013: Kindle 
Location 1168-4144).  
 Discussing foreign policy change in Georgia the study deliberately stresses on concerns 
and doubts in media and scholarly articles regarding possible change. The empirical part of 
domestic politics explains how and why the change did not happened in Georgia.  
     Also, the paper purposefully refrains to research deeper other economic indicators and 
just outlines the indicators in case of Ukraine. As for Georgia talking over economic and 
institutional reforms is regarded as the substantial argument for unaltered foreign policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
PART III-Empirical Inquires  
 
3.1. Comparative analyses of foreign policy change in Ukraine and Georgia 
 
 
3.1.1 The change that happened in Ukraine   
 
     It was the morning of November 21, 2013, when media announced that President of 
Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with the European 
Union. At first glance that was just another political game of Yanukovych. But soon those 
Ukrainians, who saw the EU as a chance, to change their lives, understood that the opportunity 
was gone. Social networks were full of anger and disappointment among Ukrainian users. A 
prominent journalist, now the member of parliament, Mustafa Nayem recalls: “The outrage 
needed an outlet. Around 8:00 p.m., I posted on Facebook: “Come on guys, let’s be serious. If 
you want to do something, don’t just “like” this post. Write that you are ready, and we can try to 
start something.” Within an hour, there were more than 600 comments. I posted again: “Let’s 
meet at 10:30 p.m. near the monument to independence in the middle of the Maidan.” When I 
arrived, maybe 50 people had gathered. Soon the crowd had swelled to more than 1,000.” 
(Nayem 2014). 
     The demonstration reached its critical turning point when President Yanukovych 
arranged a new striking deal with Vladimir Putin which allowed Russia to buy Ukrainian bonds 
for $15 billion and in return slashed the price of natural gas by a third. This news was confirmed 
the reality that Yanukovych oriented his country away from the Western world. Putin’s pressure 
was evident.  (Diuk N.2014). 
     Thousands of people easily turned in the large movement of tens of thousands and 
created the very threat for Yanukovych with the reminiscent of the Orange Revolution. That was 
the starting point of the Euromaidan started in Kyiv. Ironically it began exactly on the 10th 
anniversary of Orange Revolution that prevented Yanukovych from to become the president of 
Ukraine in 2004. Euromaidan was protesting the government’s decision to turn away from a 
European Union Association Agreement, a decision made under the Russian pressure (Kuzio 
2015).  
     For that time, Ukraine’s budget deficit was vastly growing. Foreign borrowing options 
were limited and was conditional upon foreign policy priorities. The head of the Presidential 
Administration, Serhiy Liovochkin urged Yanukovych to sign the EU Association, run for the 
next presidential elections as a reformist and use the Western option for cushion the public anger 
against the economic hardship. At the same time, it would be a tool to neutralize the Western 
criticism and to gain a larger share of the votes in the central and western parts of Ukraine, where 
the idea of closer Ukraine-EU ties was always popular. But on the other hand, it put the support 
of the Eastern part voters under the risk. Eastern voters traditionally favored closer relations with 
Russia and were already feeling anxious about the worsening of Moscow-Kyiv relations because 
Russia had refused to reduce natural-gas prices, while Yanukovych had refused to join a customs 
union with Russia.  
     The second risk of signing the Association Agreement was the prospect that official 
Moscow would impose economic sanctions against Ukraine. At the end of November of 2013, 
Russia already squeezed the import from Ukraine. Russian economic pressure was a grave 
concern for Yanukovych: his government assumed that it would instantly turn Ukraine’s 
recession into a full-blown crisis, whereas the signing of an Association Agreement remained a 
largely symbolic step for Ukrainian voters.  
     Finally, the release of Yulia Tymoshenko posed another risk. Despite the strict 
implication as a key demand to set her free, the EU was ready to sign the AA before 
Tymoshenko was released. But Yanukovych thought that the freeing her out would mean to 
handing the Ukrainian opposition a major moral victory and give her renewed standing as a 
Yanukovych critic and alienate the president’s supporters from the central and Eastern parts of 
Ukraine, because they overwhelmingly wanted to keep her in prison.  
     Once more, the President of Ukraine postponed the agreement with the EU the “same old, 
same old” strategy, chose the Russia’s financial assistance, including reduced gas prices, that 
would offer to keep social payments up, utility rates down, and short-term debt safely rolled over 
(Kudelia 2014). 
     Ukraine’s decision not to sign the AA with the European Union would not be surprise for 
many reasons.  
     Despite years of negotiations, it was evident that President Yanukovych had strong 
support from Russia and Moscow openly kept him from getting closer to the Western 
institutions. Yanukovych was considered too weak to make an independent decision. His 
economic strategy was oriented to enriched his own political and family clan while the country 
was pushed to the brink of an economic collapse. Moreover, the country was split on the overall 
political and economic orientation. The Eastern part, mostly supporters of President Yanukovych 
favored closer ties with Russia, although, the Western and half of the central Ukraine stood for 
the Western development of the country. 
 The Association   Agreement between the EU and Ukraine is part of the EU’s   Eastern 
Partnership program to strengthen the economic and political integration of the Former Soviet 
Union countries. For Ukraine, association with the EU would have been a strategic choice for 
economic modernization and growth of the country’s economy away from non-transparent and 
highly distortive economic model, heavily depended on Russia. The   Association   Agreement 
was   the chance to   improve Ukraine’s   economic and political credibility.  Regardless of all 
benefits it is hard to understand ‘’for want of a nail, a kingdom was   lost’’.   
     Moreover, it was unclear for how long time President   Yanukovych decided to put the   
AA on hold. The pressure from Russia made it harder to imagine a scenario where the Ukrainian 
President would voluntary revisit the agreement with the intention to sign it again.   
     President   Yanukovych defended his decision by pointing to the “insufficient financial 
assistance from the EU” and that it would risk putting   its trade and economic ties with Russia in 
limbo. Thus, the shift for pro- Russian Eurasian customs union seemed more plausible.  
  Experts have predicted that it was an illusion to expect a significant gain from 
strengthening ties with the Customs Union. Ukraine needed of greater external assistance to fill 
its budget and current account deficits. But additional financial aid from International financial 
institutions -IMF and World Bank, Ukraine would be anticipating only in conditions of the 
Association Agreement. In short, membership in the Customs Union would deepen Ukraine’s 
economic and energy dependency on Russian recourses and ultimately may change its statehood.    
     A better explanation for President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association 
Agreement was due to the pressure from Russia. Moreover, Yanukovych had reservations of the 
institutional and judicial reforms demanded by the EU. And it is the fact, which the President 
misjudged the popular sentiment around the country’s EU orientation (Krol M. 2013)  
 Ironically, as Yanukovych got closer to Russia so did the negative attitude of public 
opinion about Russia. Ukrainians tend to critically estimate bilateral relations. Ukraine’s 
population traditionally demonstrated a positive attitude to Russia. However, paradoxically since 
Yanukovych’s election Ukrainians’ opinion about current and future cooperation with Russia 
have changed from positive to negative. Because Yanukovych promised to restore good relations 
with Russia and population perceived him as the most competent candidate to fulfill the promise.  
    According to various surveys carried out by Ukraine’s Razumkov Center, the share of the 
population that considers the relationship with Russia unstable has continuously increased: from 
50.9 % at the end of 2009 to 64.5 % in February 2012 (Razumkov Center).  
     When the population was asked about the top priority of Ukrainian foreign policy, around 
52 per cent of respondents mentioned “relations with Russia” in November 2009, while only 31 
percent said that in February 2012 (See Figure 1). In Ukraine, as a whole, the share of the 
population that favors the deepening of relations with Russia has dropped from 78 %in 
November 2009 to 50 % in February 2012 (Razumkov Center). But on question Which foreign 
policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine? 40.8% is in favor of the EU and 31,3 %-in 
favor of Russia.  
      It is worth to mention that for the presidential administration was not easy to make such a 
decision. According to the national public opinion polls, monitoring administration concluded 
that the government had enough legitimacy to do as it deemed fit. The public remained deeply 
divided over Ukraine’s geopolitical course. Overall 45 % supported the signing of the 
Association Agreement with the EU, 35 % was against it. In response to a direct question about 
the impact of non-signing of the Association Agreement on respondents’ attitudes toward 
Yanukovych, 53 % said that their attitude toward the president would not change, 13 % reported 
that it would improve, and Only 22 % stated that their opinion of Yanukovych would worsen. 
Yanukovych administration decided that the potential for protests was not high because 
considering only about 38 % of respondents expressed the willingness to participate in protests. 
Thus, the Russian pressure and public uncertainty may be cause of foreign policy change 
decision.  
     But uncertainty was the feature of Yanukovych to. He ran his presidential campaign in 
2009 on a platform of keeping balance between Europe and Russia. Over the course of 2013, he 
began to veer increasingly toward the EU. However, Yanukovych changed his mind after Russia 
threatened to cut trade ties with Ukraine and offered a $15 billion aid package—ostensibly with 
few economic strings attached. 
     Also, it is noteworthy to say that the institutional structure of Yanukovych’s regime could 
be characterized by as more authoritarian. A small circle of friendly advisors was competing 
with against one another for the president’s favor were chosen for their loyalty to the president 
and not for their professional abilities. So, these members of Yanukovych’s ‘’family’’ weakened 
the link between senior decision-makers and mid-level bureaucrats and ultimately restricted the 
president’s ability to adequately assess information (Peisakhin L. 2015).  
     After his election as a president in February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych declared his 
intention to establish a balanced foreign policy and have strong relations with both the West and 
Russia. For Yanukovych, the EU integration was a “strategic aim” and at the same time keeping 
good, neighborly relations with Russia was also important.  Official Brussels met him as a 
“Moscow’s man” when he traveled there just in a few weeks after the election (Armandon E. 
2013:291). Labeled as being pro-Russian since the Orange Revolution in 2004, Yanukovych 
hoped to reassure his European partners, that integration into the European Union was still 
Ukraine’s top priority. But his practical steps regarding foreign policy were different. During the 
first months of his tenure, dialogue and cooperation with Moscow were privileged and quickly 
grew in intensity.  
     On April 21, 2010, Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv Agreement with his Russian 
counterpart Dmitri Medvedev, whereby Kyiv clinched a 30 percent reduction in the gas price for 
the next ten years in exchange for a 25-year extension, until 2042, of Russia’s rental of the 
Sevastopol naval base. This compromise led to the easing the diplomatic tension over the 
presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea, crises that emerged during the presidency of 
Viktor Yushchenko. Kharkiv Agreement also opened the new way of cooperation in many areas: 
economic, cultural, religious, etc. The question of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the source of 
great hostility from Russia, was no longer on the agenda; the partnership with the Atlantic 
Alliance continued, but the new law “On the Foundations of Ukraine’s Domestic and Foreign 
Policy,” adopted by the Ukrainian Rada in July 2010, stipulated Ukraine’s non-aligned status. 
The Russian language was granted greater scope in the spheres of public life (administration, 
media, education) and the law “On the Principles of the State Language Policy,” adopted in 
August 2012, further expanded Russian language legal status. Yanukovych also brought up the 
historiographical quarrels that had emerged over the grand famine of the late 1930’s to the end: 
unlike his predecessor, who considered the Holodomor a genocide perpetrated against the 
Ukrainian people, the new president declared that it was “a tragedy that affected all populations 
who lived at that time in the Soviet Union” (Ibid: 292; during the speech, delivered to the PACE 
on April 27, 2010). 
       But three years after Yanukovych’s rise to power and despite all the efforts made by 
Ukrainian authorities to re-establish good relations with Moscow, finally showed its limits. 
Moscow insisted, but Kyiv’s repeatedly refused to join the Customs Union formed by Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Ukrainian authorities’ insistence on Moscow’s re-assessment of gas 
tariffs, and the constant problems over the delimitation of borders, remained constituted sources 
of diplomatic tensions between the two states. 
     Meanwhile, Yanukovych continued to keep uncertain rhetoric. During a visit to the 
Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 21st June 2011, Yanukovych repeated this commitment: 
“Integration into Europe is still an absolute priority regarding Ukraine’s domestic and foreign 
policy''(Armandon E. 2013). 
     However, the Ukraine’s president has undertaken a policy which does not match official 
discourse. In 2010 Yanukovych demanded and Rada changed the constitution and strengthened 
presidential power. The opposition was concerned regarding rising authoritarianism of 
Yanukovych. Politically motivated persecution of opposition, imprisonment of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, regular violation of the freedom of the press, minority rights, high level of 
corruption and even significant interference in local elections fed the fear of opposition.  All this 
drift was controversial to fundamental values of Brussels.  
     According to the observer’s conclusion, October 2012 parliamentary election proved 
once again the Ukrainian leadership’s failure to show sufficient commitment to European 
democratic values and was marked “a step backward” (OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation 
Mission to Ukraine, 2012)  
 Generally speaking, with Yanukovych Ukrainians received the government on the one 
hand incapable of developing mutually-beneficial relations with Russia and on the contrary inept 
to implement political, economic and judiciary reforms necessary to meet European standards 
(Armandon E. 2013). 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Change that did not happen in Georgia 
 
 
 In a less than two months, as the new government came to power in Georgia in 2013, the 
deputy foreign minister, known for his competence and dedication to the Western institutions-
related work, resigned. Nikoloz Vashakidze, being in this position for years, claimed that the 
difference of opinion on foreign policy orientation between him and the newly elected PM 
Ivanishvili was the reason for his resignation. A day later on the TV program of Georgian Public 
Broadcaster, he explained in details how deeply he was concerned by the possible foreign policy 
change in Georgia. Vashakidze questioned Ivanishvili’s words "the Armenian foreign policy is 
worth of imitating." Vashakidze said that he could not remain in office because he did not share 
the foreign policy course of the Georgian Dream (DG) the party of B. Ivanishvili (GPB, 2013) 
(Georgian Times, 2013). 
      During his first official visits to Armenia, Bidzina Ivanishvili made several controversial 
statements. He declared full readiness to reopen the Russia-Georgia railway connected through 
the breakaway region Abkhazia and praised Armenia for its flexible foreign policy and close 
relations with Russia. “Georgia should take the example from Armenia’’-stated Ivanishvili 
(Caucasus Analytical Digest 2013). For many experts, this possibility questioned Georgia’s 
Western orientation, because Armenia never claimed its intention to join Western alliances and 
at that time was ready to go to Russia’s Customs Union.  Armenian sentiments raised concerns 
against the interests of Azerbaijan because it strengthens Russia’s position to establish its 
strategic advantage in the South Caucasus (ibid). 
     That was the first official alarming signal regarding the possible change of Georgia’s 
foreign policy orientation that that has been kept for the last 20 years.  
     Entering politics Bidzina Ivanishvili was a retail and banking tycoon who made his 
fortune in Russia having also earned the reputation of great philanthropist in Georgia. Since 
getting elected he followed through with his intention to improve economic ties with Russia. In 
2006 Russia imposed sanctions on exports of Georgian products, but the previous government 
diversified all the economic relations successfully. Despite that Ivanishvili did his best, and in 
2013 Russia agreed to open market to export key Georgian merchandise such as: wine, mineral 
water, agricultural products which had been cut off by Russia in retort to the politics pursued by 
the previous president Mikheil Saakashvili. Ivanishvili has also given a tip that he would 
consider reopening a railway to Russia cut off since the early 90s. Later Georgia Energy Minister 
Kakhi Kaladze started negotiations with Gazprom because Ivanishvili’s government believed 
that the country should not be wholly dependent on its sole supplier of gas, Azerbaijan (Stratfor 
2013). In the past natural gas, as a substantial leverage has been used by Moscow several times 
for political purposes not against Georgia alone. In a winter of 2004 after the next politically 
motivated cutting off gas from Russian side Georgia decided to cancel dependence on Russian 
energy sources altogether. So, Ivanishvili’s government’s arguments about restoring of the 
energy ties with Russia looked quite suspicious (ibid). 
     Initially, Russia saw the departure of pro-Western Saakashvili as a decisive factor for 
better relations to Georgia. Ivanishvili and his government also hoped to be able to improve 
relations. Ivanishvili with his close personal ties seemed to be a good partner. Thus, Russian 
leaders welcome Ivanishvili’s party Georgian Dream Coalition victory. Prime Minister 
Medvedev said, “we can only appreciate this [election result], as it means there will be more 
constructive and responsible forces in parliament”, and the Russian Foreign Ministry said 
Saakashvili's defeat could allow “the normalization of ties and establishment of constructive and 
respectful relations. ” (Newnham 2015). 
 The first doubts about foreign policy priorities of Bidzina Ivanishvili raised when the 
electoral program of his GD coalition was published. Manifesto declared that the ““factor of 
Georgia must no longer be on the list of controversial issues between the West and Georgia”. As 
the greatest controversy between Georgia and Russia was the Georgia’s attempt to become the 
member of NATO, concerns emerged around Ivanishvili’s electoral platform. Furthermore, The 
GD coalition believed that the Georgia must held the negotiations with breakaway regions 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly, as with the parties of the conflict. This position coincided 
with the same permanent demand of the Russia (Tabula 2012, November 13)  
 After the 2012 elections, the foreign policy-making process has changed significantly. 
The country started living in a new parliamentary system, and the president is no longer focusing 
on the decision-making process. The most significant transformation in foreign policy was that 
the new government insisted on enhancing dialog with Russia. Prime Minister Ivanishvili created 
the position of Special Representative to develop trade, economic, humanitarian, and cultural 
relations with Russia. Regarding absence of diplomatic ties between Georgia and Russia (after 
the war in 2008) seemed to break from the personal style of foreign policy making characteristic 
of the last twenty years. Ivanishvili promised non-ideological approach to foreign policy and 
lauded this pragmatism over the radical rhetoric of Saakashvili towards Russia. Saakashvili has 
condemned Ivanishvili’s pragmatism as a betrayal.  
     But Ivanishvili continued his attempts towards the balancing politics. He suggested his 
party to join to the moderate social democrats in the European Parliament. His statements were 
about dialog with Russia, returning Georgian products to the Russian market and the possible 
restoration of the railway through Abkhazia (closed during the period of Gamsakhurdia, 
president of Georgia in 1992). The appointment of Zurab Abashidze, a former Georgian 
ambassador to Russia, as a Special Representative in dialog with Russia, was justified by 
Ivanishvili as a necessity of “arrange relations with Russia and to keep up with the previous pace 
of integration in NATO’’. Also, some parts of the Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition that 
replaced the pro-Western National Movement were clearly anti-Western, and some coalition 
leaders with open statements regarding the willingness of closer relations with Russia created 
legitimate doubts whether the country continues moving toward the West (Kakachia, Cecire 
2013). 
  
 The same doubt created the public image of Ivanishvili. Before and after elections for 
some quarters of the Western media Ivanishvili was declared as pro-Russian. 
 On September 4, 2013, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili made a 
controversial statement regarding his country’s foreign policy.  Answering to journalist's 
question about what he thinks of the Eurasian Union, Ivanishvili replied: "I keep a close watch 
on and study this issue. So far, I have no position in this regard, but if, in perspective, we see that 
it [joining the Eurasian Union] will be good for the strategy of our country, then why 
not?!"(Avaliani D. 2013). 
 Soon National Democratic Institution (NDI) started polling Georgian citizens about 
support to join the Eurasian Union. From the beginning, the number of Eurasian Union 
supporters turned out totally 11%. After that, every next poll was showing a slight elevation of 
this index. Finally, in it reached 31% (NDI, Aprile, 2014). The Western media expressed 
concerns regarding a possible pro-Russian shift in Georgia.   
  “Georgia, under a new government, has attempted to defuse and improve its relations 
with Russia, while trying simultaneously to deepen its integration with the EU and NATO. 
Georgian public opinion polls also now show a growing preference for pursuing closer economic 
relations with Russia’’ (Brookings Institute-2015). 
 The most dangerous statement made by Ivanishvili was when he dwelt on the possibility 
for Georgia to join the Eurasian Union in the future if it "proves to be interesting" for Georgia 
Numerous statements which please Russia. For instance, he spoke several times about Georgia 
being responsible for August 2008 Russia-Georgia war. In one of his interviews, Ivanishvili 
justified Putin’s vendetta against Mikhail Khodorkovsky. He released people convicted of 
espionage for Russia from prison. For the period, Georgian Dream Coalition-the party of 
Ivanishvili, is in power the number of pro-Russian NGO’s, support to pro-Russian political 
parties, and anti-western propaganda in Georgian media increased significantly; Russia’s Sputnik 
News Agency opened an office in Tbilisi and launched a Russian-language News Service 
(Batashvili D. 2014). 
 The government of Georgia's moderate to Russia attitude can be noticed also in an 
interview of Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili [trusted person of Ivanishvili, has been 
appointed as PM after Ivanishvili, 2014] gave to the BBC World Service in 2014. He said that 
Russia was not a threat to Georgia (that it did not intend to annex the occupied regions of 
Georgia) and he called the occupied territories "de facto states" (BBC World news 2014). 
    Relationship with Ukraine is another suspicious field of Georgia’s pro-Russian shift after 2012 
elections. Official Tbilisi reluctantly supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine since the 
annexation of Crimea. But at the same time enthusiastically declared a moderate policy in the 
relations with Moscow. According to the Georgian prime minister Gharibashvili, he was the 
opponent of an accession of sanctions against Russia as the government values reached in recent 
years in the Russian-Georgian relations from a restoration of trade ties with Russia (Unian 2015).  
 Despite the increasing support of idea to join Eurasian Union generally the vast majority 
Georgians continue to be attracted by the Western aspiration. The number of citizens who think 
that Russia is a real and existing threat raised to 42% since 2013 when it was 36%. The number 
of supporters of Eurasian Union dropped to 11 %. While Georgians were happy to join the EU 
and the NATO more than before-72% for NATO, 78% for the EU (NDI August, 2014). 
 Unlike Ukraine Georgia can be considered as relatively anti-Russian country. Starting 
with analyses of historical experience in 19th century, when Georgia, like Ukraine, was the part 
of Russian empire and till these days, when the 20% of country’s territory is still occupied by 
Russian militants, it is hard to find part of history when Russia was not treated at least as “other’’ 
or even as an enemy. This attitude continues even after war with Russia 2008 “when it became 
clear that the West cannot play balancing role“ (K. Kakachia, S. Minesashvili 2014). Long 
history of Russian occupation of Georgian territories is the main reason why the West is so 
strongly supported in Georgia. (S. Cornell, 2006). 
 Georgia's strong and reformatory government [2003-2012] by fruitful actions, 
successfully maintained pro-Western support and even if the Western aspiration was not very 
successful, kept the country on the Euro-Atlantic way (Ó Beacháin and Coene 2014). 
 Moreover, when that reformist, pro-Western politicians went to the opposition, in 
parliament, they pressured new incumbents passing a comprehensive bipartisan resolution, which 
indicated that Georgia’s foreign policy preferences remained unchanged and proclaimed, that 
“integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures represents the top priority of the 
country’s foreign policy course.  
 Unlike Ukraine, in Georgia, the government has not changed its foreign policy 
orientation in the best of Russia´s interest. In 2012, when Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian 
Dream coalition took office there were significant concerns regarding the foreign policy plans of 
this political entity because Ivanishvili is known as a Russian tycoon and he promised to be at 
least moderate with Russia. Unlike Ukraine in 2013, the Georgian government signed an 
Association Agreement with the EU and continued further rapprochement to NATO (G. 
Merabishvili 2014).  
    Compared to Georgia, Russia is far more powerful country. Treating Georgia as its backyard 
has always been Russia’s attitude. Georgia is a small and developing country, a failed state 
within 15 years of independence. Following the Rose Revolution which broke out in November 
2003, Georgia has undergone radical changes in every sector of the government having also 
implemented fruitful and efficient reforms. What is more, nation’s strategic orientation towards 
European and Transatlantic organizations has never been that strong before.  
 Permanent threat from a tough neighbor-Russia makes Georgia to face big challenges. 
Since independence political leaders recognize this challenge and portrayed full keenness 
integration into the European Union and NATO as a single and coherent strategy that already 
become the country’s long-term strategic objective. First National Security Concept after Rose 
Revolution adopted by parliament in 2005 describes Georgia as ‘’An integral part of the 
European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in 
European values and traditions, which aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe’s  
political, economic and security systems’’ . In the later version of document of 2011 Georgian 
authorities are more security issues-oriented and next to the EU aspiration the goal of Georgian 
people to achieve fully fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and is underlined.  Contribution to the security of the Black Sea region is a constituent part of the 
Euro-Atlantic security system. NATO membership seems very distant but Georgian political 
class continues to move to the chosen direction as the Western integration is considered as a 
guarantee for the country’s security, democratic and economy strengthening. Even the Russian 
tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili and Georgia’s new leadership may seek more pragmatic approaches 
towards Russia, it is unlikely that Georgia will change its foreign policy orientation, because 
Russia’s conduct towards Georgia has alienated the country’s elites and made a pro-Russian 
stance untenable (Kakachia K. 2015) 
 As more Georgia moved toward the West so big was the pressure from Russia. As openly 
Georgian leader or government claimed western ambitions Russian establishment increased 
animosity and hostile attitude. Discussing the 25-year-long heavy tension in the Russian-
Georgian relations Korneli Kakachia concludes, that ‘’Sober analysis of Russo-Georgian 
relations in the last 20 years suggests that there is no president of Georgia that was acceptable to 
Russia and it is unlikely that a Georgian leader will arise whom Russian politicians will favor 
both politically and personally, any time soon’’. (Kakachia K. 2010) 
 Georgian Dream endeavor – to improve relations with Russia, remained unreachable.    
Russia has continued to exploit breakaway regions as its major tool of pressure, e.g., via 
promoting “borderization” (that is, the construction of barricades along the administrative 
borderline of South Ossetia and actually expanding the territory of the breakaway region). 
Russia’s proposed an “alliance and integration” treaty to Abkhazia, re-opening of trade flows, in 
particular, it has triggered new expectations in Georgia vis-à-vis the Russian market. While this 
has resulted in increased trade flows between the two, this increases the number of trade 
instruments, including embargos that Russia can utilize. It is perhaps unsurprising that the trade 
leverage was soon used again after the EU-Georgia Association Agreement was signed, when 
Russia drafted a decree suspending the Russian-Georgian Free Trade Agreement signed in 
February 1994 (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015) 
 Ivanishvili’s government fulfilled the promise and restored the trade relations with 
Russia. This action was another source of distrust to pro-Western commitment of GD 
government. Very soon, before the signing of the AA, Russian officials tried to use the recently 
restored trade leverage against Georgia. The representative of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry officially declared: "In the last period, Russia has taken the third place in 
Georgia's foreign trade turnover. This speaks of something. Every state should take 
into account the results of the relationships with an international organization and 
think about the measures that the other countries, with which they have mutual 
agreements, might take. (…) In this context it is important to realize the results of the 
signing of the Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU. This concerns our 
mutual relationships, as well as the financial-economic consequences, on which we 
will be forced to work taking into account the EU-Georgia agreement,""- said 
Alexander Lukashevich (Tabula, May 23, 2014)  
 
 On June 27, 2014 Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the European Union. 
The document was signed by Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Gharibashvili and President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso and President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy. In July, next to the 28 members of the EU the document was ratified by parliaments of 
Georgia. The EU-Georgia Association Agreement fully entered into force by 2015, however, 
part of this agreement, namely, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), 
was enacted in the same year. (Tabula, June 27,2014) This event was perceived as the 
achievement of the historical choice of the country, described earlier by the President of Georgia 
(since 2013) Giorgi Margvelashvili: “The [pro-Western] choice was made by the generations, 
and taking this path is not just our own political will, but also an obligation before our ancestors 
and our posterity” (Merabishvili G. 2014) 
 
 
3.2. Domestic political factors –Ukraine 
 
 
    In October 2013, the president of Russia Vladimir Putin offered a significant discount on 
energy prices and pledged 15 billion $ as the aid to the government of Ukraine. In return, at the 
EU summit in Vilnius President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych announced his unexpected 
decision to postpone an Association agreement with the EU. To sign the AA was the principal 
goal of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program. The Kremlin saw the partnership between Ukraine 
and the EU as a geopolitical challenge and used its leverage. Putin hoped to see Ukraine in the 
Eurasian Union- “alternative of defending the sovereignty of Russia and national unity from 
political encroachment by the EU” (Tsygankov 2015:291). It was not the first successful attempt 
of the Kremlin to pressure the government of Ukraine. For that time, Ukrainian leadership 
already has reversed the previous NATO membership course and indicated a willingness to 
accommodate Russia in strengthening its presence in the Ukrainian economy.  
    Russia justifies its interest and using the pressure on Ukraine with the “security interest.” 
Since the Orange Revolution, the strength of ties between Russia and Ukraine changed from time 
to time, and the following cases of pressure occurred:  
1.   “Frozen ties (2004–2010)-Warnings against NATO membership. Blocking Ukraine’s MAP 
in NATO. Pressures to control Naftogaz Termination of gas deliveries Delay of sending new 
ambassador  
2.    Limited partnership (2010-2013) Lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet extended until 2035. 
Reduction of gas prices. Pressures to join the Customs Union. Pressures to control Naftogaz 
Financial aid” (ibid 297). 
      
 
 
 
3.2.1. Corruption 
 
     
 Corruption in Ukraine is recognized as the national, generalized moral phenomenon that 
penetrated every level of society, deeply rooted in the lifestyle and the way of thinking. 
Corruption on the government level created an independent state of bureaucracy that has full 
control over the state services and political activity. Money flows without regard to any formal 
responsibility.  Ordinary citizens are also becoming corrupted, supporting the circle of 
corruption, resulting in a lack of trust society-wide (Korostelina, 2013)  
     In 2004, after the Orange Revolution brought to the power the West-oriented democratic 
forces under the leadership of President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko, with the hope of political and economic development. Yushchenko seemed to 
recognize the inevitable necessity of reforming country as he declared in his January 2005 
inauguration speech: “We took an irreversible step to democracy. There will be an equal 
application of the law. An independent court will protect everyone. The rule of law will govern 
Ukraine. Business will be separated from political power. The state budget will no longer serve 
as someone’ s source of enrichment” (Ukrainskaia Pravda, 2005)  
     But the new Orange government dissolved in renewed political chaos. Rather than 
implementing reforms, in 2005 the Orange government fought over old privatizations. 
Meanwhile, relations with Russia soured over gas and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). The Yushchenko administration had been spectacularly chaotic and unable to rule. 
Hardly any reforms were adopted during the five years of Yushchenko’s presidency, and 
corruption seemed undefeatable. (Aslund, 2015)   
     During his five-year term (2005–2010), President Viktor Yushchenko and his team failed 
to reform state institutions and go beyond a mere personnel change. In the wake of the Orange 
Revolution, President Yushchenko and other “Orange” leader, Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko replaced some 18,000 government officials on the grounds of political loyalty 
(Bogomolov and Lytvynenko, 2009)  
     Yushchenko used his influence over the government’ s opportunities for patronage and 
rent-seeking, appoint to offices high-level official, judges, head of Central Bank-NBU. For 
instance, Yushchenko used President’ s coercive resources to secure the possessions of his crony, 
Firtash effectively. Firtash, in turn, was Yushchenko’ s close supporter and a key member of so 
called the “gas lobby.” Tymoshenko supported different oligarchs, among them Kolomoiskiy’ s 
Privat Group, in his attempt to take over Pinchuk’ s ferroalloy company.  
     Under Yushchenko’ s decisive influence his long-time ally Volodymyr Stelmakh as NBU 
chairman, issuing loans to private banks, regulating financial markets, and providing funds for 
the government’ s projects. During the 2008 global financial crisis, which was accompanied by a 
sharp depreciation of the Ukrainian currency, the NBU provided about $5 billion to refinance 
commercial banks. As Tymoshenko later alleged, close to $1,5 billion was issued for the banks 
close to President Yushchenko, including the one related to Firtash, for 5 – 7% commission.   
     According to Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, his ministry submitted annually up to 
15,000 cases of corruption among state officials to the prosecutor’s s office, but no further action 
was taken. The courts became even more vulnerable to political interference under Yushchenko 
then they were under Kuchma (Kudelia 2012). 
     Tymoshenko’s second government (2007–2010) ended the rent schemes, which 
supported Yushchenko, mainly eliminating the Rusenergo intermediary gas agreement, 2009 
with Russia and terminating production-sharing agreement on the development of the Black Sea 
shelf. At the same time, the new government created the opportunity for many new rent-seeking 
to friendly businesses, notably, introducing the practice of holding tenders with one pre-selected 
participant which allowed officials to provide contracts to favored companies. In 2008, almost 
half of all tenders were conducted with one participant distributing contracts worth up to $10 
billion. The largest tenders benefited big businesses which funded Tymoshenko’s electoral 
campaigns, particularly the Industrial Union of Donbas (Nayem, 2009).  
     Political corruption, another form of corruption is widespread in Ukraine. Ukraine has 
built a weak democracy with little public trust in state institutions, and nothing changed in this 
regard during Yushchenko’s presidency. The corruption as the biggest threat to Ukraine’ s 
democracy, continues to be a major problem. The parliament of Ukraine is the place where the 
attempt to bribe members of Rada to change factions, altered election results and reduced public 
trust in state institutions, political parties, and elections was a natural part of political agenda. 
Yanukovych was one of the famous creators of political corruption since 2006. He respectively 
bribed and blackmailed opposition deputies and defected ruling coalition. Through the bribery or 
intimidation, Yanukovych extorted the political support from the Rada members and sought to 
increase its party of regions to the constitutional majority. Finally, defections led to President 
Yushchenko issuing his April 2007 decree and disbanding parliament  
     A similar strategy continued after Yanukovych ’s election 2010 but in a more 
sophisticated way. As the President, he was no longer blocking political corruption of parliament 
but encouraging it.  By 2011 over sixty opposition MP's from Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense, 
the party of former President Yushchenko and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko had been 
“encouraged” to defect to the Stability and Reforms Coalition-created by Yanukovych 
pretending opposition. Allegations that they receive bribes of between $1 – 10 million and 
$25,000 a month commission was confirmed.  The member of parliament from the former 
President Yushchenko’s Party [opposition for that time], Doniy revealed he had twice been 
offered $10 million for defecting to the Party of Regions plus $20,000 a month. Previously the 
Yushchenko’s government had found evidence in the budget of predecessor government about 
payments of $1.5 million to deputies elected two years earlier in majoritarian districts (Kuzio 
2012) 
     Apparently, the Kremlin was interested in corruption in Ukraine more than in commercial 
viability of the Russian state company Gazprom. Commercial interest was in the third place 
compare to the most important goal- the enrichment of top Russian officials and the geopolitics. 
Gazprom was an efficient tool in the hands of Russia to undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine. 
Russia was cutting gas supplies to Ukraine twice during the Orange period, in January 2006 and 
January 2009. Russia exercised pressure on Yanukovych to the extension of Russia’s lease on 
the Sevastopol naval base for another 25 years in April 2010 in return for the gas price reduction. 
If treat the Gazprom as an organized crime syndicate, to give up any dependence on oil or gas 
transit from Russia, Ukraine could clean up its government from the main domestic problem-
corruption, is the number of experts advised. (Aslund, 2015; Balmaceda M. 2013; Kuzio T. 
2015).  
 For many Ukrainians, it was evident that there was an insignificant difference between 
Orange government and Yanukovych’s regime. All they were equally corrupt. Not state, nor 
economy and institutions were modernized. Oligarchs continue de facto rule the country. 
Paradoxically, pro-Western government of Yushchenko was more incompetent than pro-Russian 
Yanukovych. (Aslund, A. (2015. Kindle Locations 1930-1935) Ukrainians did not appreciate 
more democracy and freedom, the values associated with the West were connected to the failure 
in their minds.  
 
 
 
3.2.2. Political elite  
 
     While Russia had good geopolitical and economic reasons to influence Ukraine, it used 
tools to defend or undermine certain regimes. Russia facilitated exclusive business deals for 
particular Ukrainian companies, mostly belong to oligarchs that supported desirable for Russia 
government. The Kremlin kept the close connection to the inner political and business circles in 
Ukraine. Provides stable energy supply and offers fair prices in support of the pro-Russian 
candidate in politics and pursued election bolstering in these ways.  The first, who openly 
became Russia’s favorable candidate was Viktor Yanukovych. Putin, who was hugely popular 
for that time, not only at home but across the post-Soviet space, held numerous high-profile 
meetings with Yanukovych and praised his political skills publically. The Kremlin was involved 
in the financing of Yanukovych’s election campaign in 2004.  
 According to the various estimates, the total Russian contribution ranged from US$50 
million to US$600 million. Prominent Russian political technologists publically participated in 
the process.  Putin declared that value-added tax (VAT) on oil exports to Ukraine would be 
removed.  In the result petrol costs immediately lowered by an amount equivalent to US$800 
million, helping Yanukovych raise the resources to lubricate voters by doubling pensions just 
two months before the first round of the elections. Moreover, Moscow also played a dominant 
role in attempts to eliminate leading figures of the opposition. Russian prosecutors reopened a 
case of embezzlement charges against the second-most popular opposition leader and later prime 
minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, sending a request to Interpol for her arrest. Also, speculations exist 
that Russia was involved in several assassinations attempts on Yushchenko. Russia signaled to 
both, politicians and voters that alternation in power would carry significant costs.  
    Before the second round of election between Yushchenko and Yanukovych Putin suggested to 
Yanukovych rigging by inflating turnout in trusted regions instead of focusing on falsifying the 
votes cast.  In contrast to Western observers, the Russian-controlled Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) election observation mission fully endorsed the elections and Putin 
himself congratulating Yanukovych on his victory, even before the official results were 
announced. Ultimately the Orange Revolution started in 2004. People, hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators took to the streets in  Kiev against the Russian-backed Yanukovych. Only in the 
last minutes the interfere of Western countries saved the Maidan protesters from the state 
violence. (Tolstrup 2015) 
     Russian election bolstering did help Yanukovych during the further failed presidency of 
Yushchenko. Yanukovych’ s presidency from 2010 exposed both the weakness of Ukraine’ s 
state institutions and the superficiality of its democratic gains under the Yushchenko. 
Disadvantages of the pro-Western Yushchenko untied hands for the pro-Russian policy of 
Yanukovych. Yanukovych has removed NATO membership from the foreign policy agenda and 
backed Russian proposals for “common European security architecture“. In September 2008, 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and Communist Party of Ukraine-another pro-Russian political 
entity, had supported recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 
Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments, an action that no other country or political force in the CIS 
did, including Belarussian President Lukashenko. Yanukovych also ran political repression in 
spite the protest from the Western countries and institutions and imprisoned Tymoshenko, 2011. 
(Kuzio 2012). 
    The election of Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych in February 2010 brought to 
power in Ukraine the most neo-Soviet political leader since the USSR disintegrated. Soviet 
political culture and conspiracy theories permeate the Yanukovych administration, the 
government led by Party of Regions leader and Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov, and parliament 
where the Party of Regions dominates the Stability and Reforms coalition. (Kuzio 2011) 
    Yanukovych’s presidency was a clear sign of ideologically driven pro-Russian domestic 
national and foreign policymaking. Yanukovych successfully camouflaged his statements and 
views through the use of American political consultants and technologies while his Prime 
Minister Mykola Azarov has never hidden his Sovietophile and Russophile views. Furthermore, 
in his first months in office, Yanukovych did not hide his intention to implement pro-Russian 
rhetoric in both, domestic and foreign politics. It included rewriting of the school textbooks, 
Soviet tirades against “Ukrainian nationalism,” preference for the monopolization of religious 
life by the Russian Orthodox Church, servility for Russian policies in the CIS and support for 
reuniting major areas of the Ukrainian and Russian economies. (T. Kuzio, 2010) 
 
 Ukraine’s society is unconsolidated around the foreign policy orientation- Russia or the 
West. The practical polices under Yanukovych can be judged as moving closer to the EU. But 
eventually Yanukovych changed his mind because his Party of Regions goal always was too pro 
Russian. Ukraine is a young democracy, ethnically cleansed many times over during 70 Soviet 
years, with large Homo Sovieticus remnants among the electorate and pro-Soviet/Russian parties 
still had a significant support-40% in elections. Joining the Europe implied to remain on the path 
chosen by the Orange Revolution and as a result a substantial improvement of country’s 
economic and political conditions. But in practice, it was difficult for Yanukovych personally to 
realize these goals (Svyetlov 2007). 
    Yanukovych was always perceived as the ‘’Russian guy’’. Russia used to be involved in 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, providing political, financial or "technical"   
support to pro-Russian political parties or candidates. Yanukovych and Party of Regions were 
among them. In the 2004 elections, the Russian authorities openly backed Viktor   Yanukovych. 
Russian backing was a guaranty of the voters supports from the eastern, Russia-inclined part of 
Ukraine. But in 2004 the "Orange Revolution" bought Viktor Yushchenko to power. The painful 
defeat of pro-Russian Yanukovych was a proof that Ukraine and Russia follow separate 
development paths. Orange Revolution was another incentive for Russia to consider how to keep 
the influence over Ukraine.  
    Yanukovych came to power in 2006, in the result of parliamentary elections and became a 
prime minister of Ukraine. As a real Russian candidate, he had significant support from 
oligarchic groups in Ukraine.  Oligarchs based their power on traditional sectors of the economy, 
such as the Energy sector. Efficient management of oligarchs would not be possible without 
cooperation with Russia. The interest to have closer relations with the Eastern neighbor was 
present. Party of Regions is known as an advocate of closer ties with Russia and opposition of 
Ukraine's accession to NATO. In practice, however, its policy is less clear-cut. Party of Regions 
is divided into two wings. One of its wings, tentatively called "political"-Mykola Azarov (former 
head of Rada) supports closer ties with Russia. The second, "business" side (Oligarch Rinat 
Akhmetov), primarily wants more efficient state mechanisms, trade and developing cooperation 
with the Western states (Szeptycki A. 2007). 
 IN fact, the oligarchy blossomed during Yanukovych presidency. For a while, he 
attempted economic reform. However, Yanukovych developed “capitalism in one family” 
because corruption at the top level reached a new apogee. The economy stagnated. Initially, 
Yanukovych appeared “to be like a stationary bandit, with an apparent interest in boosting 
economic growth. Soon, however, he revealed himself to be a roving bandit, wanting to 
concentrate as large a share as possible of the existing wealth to his family as fast as possible, 
caring little about his nation’s future, though he also nurtured a populist streak.” (Aslund A. 
2015: Kindle Locations 2072-2074) 
  
 
 
3.3.3. Economic indicators and Energy Dependency  
     
    Ukrainian economy and energy sector creates another room for Russian pressure. The 
economy in Ukraine remained significantly dependent on Russia since its state independence. 
Around 1.5 thousands of Ukrainian enterprises and military-industrial establishments were 
connecting with Russia’s industrial cycles that prevent to establish an independent Ukrainian 
economy. Two countries are noticeably intertwined because of the inherited USSR’s economic 
infrastructure. In 2011 Ukraine came into its twentieth anniversary of independence with a 
destroyed infrastructure and economy. The current GDP of Ukraine is only 63 to 75 percent of 
the level of 1991. During 20 year of independence, there has been no significant economic 
development:15% of the economic structure of Ukraine was developed before 1917, 5–7% 
during 1920–40s, 80%- during 1956–89 and after 1991 where was almost no economic or 
institutional development. There is capital outflow, inflation, lack of investments. Ukraine uses 
old infrastructures and enterprises, losing its industrial potential. Ukraine’s economy is crucially 
dependent on Russia’s economy and energy resources (Korostelina K. 2013).  
The largest share of Ukrainian exports 2004-2014 goes to Russia. Ukraine was very 
dependent on Russian market and share of import was substantial as well. Russia   
remained number one trade partner even during Orange government.   
 Ukraine’s overwhelming energy dependency on Russia fully maintains Russian 
geopolitical interest in Ukraine. The old industry is inefficient and energy-consuming. In the face 
of scarce domestic natural resources in contrast to Russia that has vast reserves and pipelines, 
Ukraine is doomed to depend on Russia. Even more, when Russia cut off the gas supply to 
Ukraine, EU consumers of Russian gas blamed Ukrainian side for crises whereas, in fact, Russia 
punished pro-Western Orange government.  
    Besides the dependency, Ukraine retains a massive debt to Gazprom. Russia reminded to 
Ukrainian people that although they are free to make a choice in elections, gas supply and the 
price on it as the leverage would be using for support of the pro-Russian, rather than a pro-
Western government. With energy force Russia retains a hegemonic attitude in the region, 
Ukraine included (Proedrou 2010).  
 The energy dependency is the highly politicized as foreign policy issues inherited from 
the Soviet past. In the post-Soviet time, any trade relations with Russia is unavoidably perceived 
as a politically significant business with the hegemon. In fact, some Russian politicians openly 
called for the use of energy as a political weapon in Russia’s relationships with various former 
republics and by this revealed the intention of Russia to manipulate neighbors politically. (Kindle 
Locations 161-410). 
 Despite the central role of an anti-corruption rhetoric in Yushchenko’s 2003– 2004 things 
did not change as hoped for after the Orange Revolution, and energy issues continued to be a 
prime area of political scandals and Russian influence. The very first few weeks after 
Yushchenko’s inauguration, the serious differences in economic interests coexisting within the 
coalition, and also Yushchenko’s inability or unwillingness to separate business and politics.  In 
March 2005, the government led by PM Tymoshenko started to investigate corruption in state 
monopolies, including national company Naftohaz, but there was significant opposition-
President Yushchenko seems just stopped the investigation. Finally, Yushchenko dismissed PM 
Tymoshenko and raised the doubt that this action was related to the desire to halt the 
investigations. Then, in 2006 Russia started to use its energy leverage against pro-Western 
Orange government and cut off supply to Ukraine and for East Europe countries for three days. 
 
     Negotiations with Russia were challenging and ineffective. In the fall of 2005 and a 
possibly Russian-provoked standoff with a price demand that had risen quickly from $ 95 to $ 
150 to $ 230 per thousand cm, in comparison with the then current price of $ 50. Despite these 
tensions, however, Ukraine continued to neglect its main counterweight to energy dependency on 
Russia, gas imports from Turkmenistan, which continued to suffer from allegations of unpaid 
debts and unfulfilled barter contracts.  
     Ukraine’s mismanagement of this vital relationship gives some reason to believe that the 
escalation of the price dispute with Gazprom was used as a means to create an artificial scarcity 
as a cover to introduce new rent-seeking schemes by actors on both sides of the border.  
     The presidency of Yushchenko was the time of chaos and lack of transparency for energy 
policy in Ukraine. The new agreement of January 2006 agreements significantly worsened the 
country’s energy security situation.  There was no transparency on how these new prices were 
forming. The deal forced Ukraine to remain locked into charging a small gas transit fees until 
2009, allowed gas prices to be increased unilaterally, while transit fees could not, and the most 
important, however, was the question of contractual diversification -by making RosUkrEnergo 
the sole operator of the country’s gas imports, Ukraine became contractually tied to a single 
supplier that received significant profits in exchange for unnecessary intermediary services. 
     Because of lack the transparency it was impossible to know what gas was importing 
because the January 2006 contract was specifically for a cocktail of gasses assumed to come 
from Russian and Central Asian sources, according to statistics of the Ukrainian Fuel and Energy 
Ministry.  
     Ukraine’s blatant energy dependency on Russia, its government’s inability to take a 
united, strong policy stance on energy issues, made the country especially vulnerable to price 
fluctuations and unable to respond proactively to changes coming from Russia’s new pipeline 
initiatives, which, by 2015 could sidetrack a significant amount of oil and gas transit volumes 
away from Ukraine, further reducing its bargaining power. (Kindle Locations 2748-3422). 
 Energy relations between Russia and Ukraine continued to deteriorate despite general 
expectations that relations would improve after the coming to power of “pro-Russian” 
Yanukovych, and that the 2009 agreements would be revised to terms more favorable to Ukraine. 
Yanukovych’s started revision of the 2009 contracts with domestic political processes. In 
October 2011, he convicted opposition leader Tymoshenko for abuse of office and illegality of 
the 2009 contracts was cited as the reason for the need for revision.     
     During Yanukovych’s presidency, the new economic reality was created. For the first 
time in the history of independent Ukraine, some desirable developments as a clear financial 
incentive for a reduction in energy imports from Russia followed: In particular, gas consumption 
went down by nearly 10 percent between 2008 and 2011. In particular, industrial gas 
consumption declined sharply with the drop in production resulting from the 2008– 2009 
economic crisis. Ukraine’s industrial output went down by 22 percent in 2009, industrial-sector 
gas consumption during the same period fell even faster, by nearly 40 percent. It must be noted, 
that much of the reduction in gas consumption was due, in addition to modernization efforts in 
the metallurgical industry, to the effects of the global economic crisis (Ukraine’s GDP went 
down by 15 percent in 2009); after the immediate crisis gas demand partially recovered, going up 
to 59.3 billion cm in 2011. After relatively rapid decreases in energy intensity between 2000 and 
2008, that indicator started to stagnate and increase again in 2008– 2010. This made the limited 
impact of the import price shock on the public/ residential sector-56 percent of total gas use. 
Moreover, the relative gap between the prices paid by households and import gas prices grew 
significantly between 2004 and 2012. But, one central feature of the Ukrainian energy economy 
has not changed: the significant difference between the prices of gas supplied to the industrial 
sector and the public/ residential area creating incentives for illegal supply schemes involving 
public sector gas for industrial use. Very few opportunities for energy diversification was used 
during Yanukovych as well. Only once there was an attempt to import of tiny amounts of gas 
(0.06 billion cm) from the German company RWE, in 2012, in lower price. (Balmaceda M. 
2013: Kindle Locations 3357-3390).  
 Yanukovych claimed many times publicly that due to difficulties in negotiations with 
Russia about prices of natural gas it was important to seek ways of diversification. The price of 
gas for that time was 516 $ per thousand cm. In several interviews, Yanukovych expressed deep 
concerns regarding unacceptable price (Channel 24, January 2012; Podrobnosti, February 2012). 
It was fourth year since Yanukovych supported calls for extending the Black Sea Fleet’s 
presence in Sevastopol for 25 years until 2042. It happened long before the global financial crisis 
hit Ukraine’s economy in 2008 (T. Kuzio, 2010) Yanukovych’s first big task was to reduce the 
price of gas from Russia by 30 percent. But the task remained unreachable because right after the 
postponing of signing the AA with the EU Yanukovych was not sure continue negotiations with 
Russia or not and just expressed the hope about lesser price of gas and discussed further 
diversification of energy sources (Ura-Inform, December 19, 2013)    
     Gas price was the most important IMF condition for Ukraine. Yanukovych’s government 
hiked domestic gas prices to reduce losses of Naftogaz on 2 percent of GDP each year, which 
were ultimately financed by the state budget, that is, the taxpayers. 
     Naftogaz sold gas to consumers and utilities at prices far below the price it pays 
Gazprom. After raising gas prices once, Yanukovych refused to raise the very low gas prices 
again and aborted the reform of the gas sector. By political motives, he insisted on small 
regulated gas prices. His official justification was that the population would suffer from higher 
gas and utility prices, but a more likely reason was that the Yanukovych family benefited from 
arbitrage between low fixed rates and high market prices. And Russia continued to use energy 
leverage against Ukraine (Aslund 2015). 
 
 
 
3.3. Domestic political factors –Georgia 
 
 
The foreign policy of the small, post-Soviet state of Georgia tends to be considered as a 
contradiction to the rational, neo-realistic rule of Waltzian theory whereby a weak state, as usual, 
recognizes that a more powerful state can affect it considerably and chooses a balancing policy 
(Waltz K.1979). This means that Georgia, as a weak state, has rejected pursuing a bandwagoning 
strategy with Russia since the Rose Revolution. Despite Russia’s will and significant 
pressure from economic sanctions, in 2008, the war led to the recognition of the independence 
of Georgia’s breakaway regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Georgian foreign policy 
called for continuity in moving to the West and further away from Russia (Gvalia et al. 2013). 
Experts argue that such behavior becomes explicable when regarding certain domestic policy. 
 
 
3.3.1.  Corruption 
 
 Before the 2003 Rose Revolution, corruption permeated nearly every aspect of life in 
Georgia. The police were stationed at almost every crossroads and extorted bribes for false 
infractions. The government was totally corrupt. Citizens paid bribes to 
acquire passports or driver's licenses, start businesses, and enter universities; companies paid 
bribes to revenue officers to avoid taxes, and restaurants bribed state inspectors to avoid 
punishment for violating sanitary standards. Police were under the influence of the criminal 
gangs called “thieves-in-law.” State officials who officially earned about 100$ per month, in 
reality, were rich people. Only a few people paid utility bills (World Bank, 2012). 
Georgia as one of the failed states associated with “Russian model of development.” For 
senior-level foreign policy makers, bandwagoning foreign policy meant to return to the criminal 
and corrupt state of the 90s and Russia (Gvalia at al. 2013:113). Thus, the critical mass of young 
reformers came to power in the result of the peaceful “Rose Revolution,” united by the idealistic 
vision and mutual trust started overwhelming reforms and first of all fighting corruption. The 
government of Saakashvili invited Estonian prime minister Mart Laar as an advisor because the 
Estonian economy and society were perceived as a success story compares not only to the former 
Soviet Union, but to the Central European countries of Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary. 
Ranked 124 among 133 in 2003 by the Transparency International the country started 
rapid reforms that targeted each slot of the life in an integral manner. The president of the 
country who was perceived as an engine of the fighting corruption and other reforms the 
effectively used the window of opportunity and with the slogan “Just do it!” moved to the main 
goal-radically decreasing of corruption (Bennich-Björkman L. 2016). 
The Government of Georgia started with the salaries of officials. Soviet time generation of 
politicians and administrators was changed on the new generation of highly motivated, 
inexperienced people and the minimum wage (1200$) in 2003 was paid that increased further in 
late years. The police salary increased ten times from 20$ to 200$. More expenses on public 
servant’s wages became possible because of significantly increased tax revenue. The 
complicated and high taxation was dramatically changed. The number of taxes was reduced from 
21 to 6; all individual tax rates were reduced, and all the remaining taxes were replaced with a 
flat tax rate system; licenses slashed and permits cut by nearly 90 percent. For instance, the 
number of licenses was reduced from more than 300 to 41, and the number of licenses from over 
600 to 53 (Gilauri N. 2017). The reduced government with high salaries appeared a useful idea 
for tackling corruption because the incentive to remain in a higher paying job made bureaucrats 
less keen to take bribes. One more critical filed of corruption was The State Traffic Inspection 
Gaishnik- the Soviet-style road police, the GAI (State Automobile Inspection). GAI was almost 
self-financed by the extortion, both from local and foreign drivers as they traveled Georgian 
roadways. According to estimates, 80 percent of the money extorted from drivers was distributed 
along the chain of command all the way up to the minister (Burakova L. 2011). 
The reform of the traffic police started with dismissing 30,000 police from the system 
overnight. A new, well-trained staff was formed in two months, and no one seemed to notice that 
the country was functioning without police during that time. Everything related to the police 
became transparent, both externally and internally. As a symbol of the new approach, new, 
transparent, glass police buildings were built. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General 
Inspection acted as the primary anticorruption tool. Soon, the punitive Gaishnik, which had 
nothing to do with law enforcement, was transformed into a public agency that provided security 
and stability (Aslund A. Djankov S. 2014:149-165). 
Tax reductions created the incentive not to pay bribes to tax collectors but pay 
taxes directly to the state budget, which increased dramatically. The share of government 
revenues rose from 14 percent of GDP in 2003 to 21 percent in 2005 (immediately after the 
reform). Continued tax reductions increased tax collection to 27 percent of GDP by 2012, despite 
the fact that Georgia has the third lowest tax rates in Eastern Europe, according to the World 
Bank (ibid 2012). 
Despite strident opposition, an extensive program of privatization was carried out. 
Privatizing electricity generation/distribution networks, natural gas distribution systems, 
agricultural land, seaports, airports, and other infra- structure. The government started selling 
with long-term tradable rights mineral deposits, air frequencies. Privatization led to institutional 
changes. A larger proportion of better-managed private companies made the economy more 
flexible and resilient. All these measures contributed to the reduction of corruption and brought 
additional revenue to the government (Aslund A. Djankov S. 2014:149-165). 
Totally Between 2006 and 2011 alone, Georgia completed 35 reforms qualifying under 
the World Bank’s “Doing Business” criteria, i.e., half a dozen per year. According to the World 
Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” report, the global average for such reforms was 1.7 per year at 
the time. What is more, all Georgian reforms were initiated and overseen by the same small 
group of people, rather than by different consecutive administrations. “Since the World Bank 
began keeping records, no other country has made so many deep reforms in so many different 
areas so consistently” cites the WB the former PM Nika Gilauri (Gilauri N. 2017) 
In Georgia, 2003-2012 happened the same What occurred in Estonia in 1992-1994. The 
“same small group of people” (Gilauri N. 2017: vii) took advantage of the rare moments of 
creative politics-window of opportunity. “The descriptions from the participants in these 
formative governments of the time, be they politicians or non-politicians, unite in the way the 
picture a time of intense and emergency-oriented work, a strong commitment towards shared 
goals, the chemistry between many of those who worked, and a transcendent meaning 
permeating policy-making. A new state and society were being formed, not particular interests 
being served or political parties working simply for re-election” (Bennich-Björkman L. 
2016:19). 
The corruption perception index CPI continued to be improved after the 2012 election 
when the new political entity came to power. 2004-136, 2014-50 (TI, CPI 2015) 
 
 
3.3.2. Political Elite 
 
Georgia is a European country and not a post-Soviet state is the core idea that drives the 
Georgian elites to understand Georgia’s place in the world. Georgia abandoned 
the bandwagoning policy toward Russia without looking back since the Rose Revolution. 
President Saakashvili and his government, openly Western-oriented, transformed both, domestic 
and foreign policy. Next to ambitious reforms in the country’s security, economic, and 
educational systems, firing the entire police force and eradicate corruption, Georgia has 
intensified relations with the United States, NATO, and the EU, while further distancing itself 
from Russia, its actual threat. Georgian political leadership implied to every sphere the European 
Identity and announced the willingness to build the country by Western standards and values.  
Joining NATO and the EU is appreciated not only regarding the security and prosperity it affords 
but equally as an external affirmation of Georgia’s European identity. “I am Georgian; therefore, 
I am European,” proclaimed in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1999, 
long before the Rose Revolution, were the words of the former head of Parliament Zurab 
Zhvania, which turned into the benchmark of the new Georgian political elite. 
Domestic efforts at modernization and reform were perceived as the basis for integration 
into the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO was conceived of as a “political system with the 
highest democratic values,” not just a security institution or military alliance. The intense focus 
on economic reforms and other domestic factors in the context of the modernization idea and 
“integrating into Western economic structures” distanced the country from Russia. The Georgian 
ruling political class saw Russia as an ideological rather than a geopolitical or strictly 
economic rival. The objective of the Saakashvili government's foreign policy was the creation 
and consolidation of a Western-style democracy, with a willingness to make some immediate 
economic sacrifices and take security risks (Gvalia et al. 2013). 
As evidence of its commitment to the Western course, Georgia increased to 950 the 
number of its troops deployed in the 31st infantry battalion in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the 
Great Britain and the United States, Georgia became the largest per capita contributor (Civil.ge. 
2010). 
If the previous political elite was more oriented towards Russia, it was mainly because of 
their past. The new, young elite had a strong Western identity. Their Western education and 
socialization in the West was the primary cause of the initial change in, and subsequent 
continuity of Georgia’s foreign policy said the former Deputy Foreign Minister Sergi Kapanadze 
(Gvalia et al. 2013:124) 
Along to the modernization of the “Color” revolution government had the radical rhetoric 
toward Russia. The National Security Council (NCS) document published in 2012 keeps the 
statement that “Georgia was the victim of Russian aggression that led to 70 years of Soviet 
occupation […] The 2008 War demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the 
sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia’s choice of democracy and its independent domestic 
and foreign policy […] Broadening the integration processes in Europe, is essential for the 
security of Georgia. Georgia is a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, the 
expansion eastward of NATO and the European Union is necessary for Georgia” (NSC concept, 
2012). The politicians came to power next to “Color” revolution government changed rhetoric, 
but the strategic goals remained the same. For instance, Georgia continued to serve as a valuable 
partner for NATO, and in 2013, the country positioned itself as a premier counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism force for the alliance. Georgian forces still enjoyed a strong, professional 
reputation in the ISAF program. NATO reacted proportionally and included Georgian forces 
within the newly established rapid reaction force. Experts regarded this step as evidence of 
Georgia’s de facto integration within the NATO military structures. Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations persisted and became determinant of strategic direction and foreign policy (Cecire 
M., 2013). 
The signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union was not in any doubt. 
The Prime Minister addressed the nation from Brussels: "That is Europe, its political, economic, 
social, and cultural environment, from which our country was artificially alienated for centuries. 
It is tough to express in words what I feel and experience as a Georgian right now. I am 
convinced that everyone in my homeland is overwhelmed with the same emotions,” said 
Gharibashvili. In every Georgian city, there were activities organized by the state and translated 
on every nationwide public and private TV channel, large-scale concerts and fireworks 
(Agenda.ge, 2014). 
Nevertheless, as the party and government of Saakashvili were known as salient pro-
Western and confrontational towards Russia, the political entity, newly elected 2012 GD 
coalition initially stressed a moderate attitude and improvement of relations with Russia 
(Civil.ge, February 11, 2013). At the same time, some members of the Ivanishvili’s coalition 
had been openly pro-Russian, and these people shifted the confrontational rhetoric from against 
the West. They started to reject the NATO aspiration, criticize the previous government for its 
anti-Russian position, and question Western values of human rights. All members of the 
coalition, including Ivanishvili, tried to avoid calling the active presence of Russia in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia an occupation and even blamed the Russian occupation of Georgia on Georgia 
itself (Tabula, November 13, 2012). 
On the other hand, the GD's willingness to improve relations with Russia can be seen as 
a benefit for Georgia's participation with the West. The approach of reducing tensions with 
Russia can be seen as a constructivist, practical diplomatic measure that aspires to improve 
the country's prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, the new parliament, with a majority 
GD coalition, adopted a bipartisan resolution on foreign policy with a clear declaration of the 
country's Western aspiration goals: "Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures 
represents the top priority of the country’s foreign policy course. (…) Georgia will not join such 
international organizations, whose policies contradict these priorities” (Civil.ge March 7, 2013) 
Saakashvili and his party United National Movement (UNM) tried to blame GD and its 
founder Ivanishvili to be the Russia’s marionettes and warned the citizens of Georgia not to 
allow the country “to return to the Past.” This populist trend implies that assessing everything 
that raises doubts regarding pro-Russian orientation as anti-national. UNM used Europe as the 
role model for successful development. Institution-building became the part of national—e.g. the 
Western—narrative. Total policies were packed as the national interest of the country to achieve 
the historical goal and return Georgia to its rightful place Europe (Merabishvili G. 2014) 
At the time in 2004, Saakashvili was also criticized that he was too open for Russian 
interests. For instance, when he was invited to Georgia Russian business forum and ultimately, 
recruited the Russian-based tycoon Kakha Bendukidze, a native Georgian, Chief Executive 
Officer of Russia’s largest private heavy engineering corporation, United Heavy Machinery 
Kakha Bendukidze as Georgia’s minister of economics with the big mandate of reforms 
(Civil.ge. December 16, 2004). In the same regard, the concerns around the GD coalition are 
legitimate because the character of relations between Russia determines the level of the relation 
to EU and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Despite extremely tense relations between the Saakashvili government and the GD 
opposition following the October 2012 transfer of power, Georgia’s commitment to pro-Western 
policies enjoyed bipartisan consensus (Nodia G., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Energy dependency and economic background 
 
 
Georgia is one of the countries experienced in a tense energy and economic relations and 
direct pressure from Russia. Compared to the neighboring Azerbaijan, Georgia has no gas and 
oil, and the USSR was entirely dependent on Russian sources. Until 2006, Georgia imported 
100% of natural gas from Russia; Russia was the number one trading partner, accounting for 
almost 20% of Georgia’s total trade. In 2003 and 2006, the trade with Russia increased (Gvalia et 
al., 2013). 
Georgia, as a typical former Soviet republic, also relied on the Soviet Union's standard 
electrical network, creating a further vulnerability for the country. Since the Saakashvili 
government came to power, they revealed themselves as pro-Western politicians, and Moscow 
soon began applying energy sanctions to Georgia. It started with gas price increase promises. 
From the beginning, Russia demanded that Georgia sell all its gas pipelines to Gazprom [Russian 
state energy giant]. At the peak of Russia's energy pressure on Georgia in 2005-06, the country 
seemed close to giving in to this demand. However, in the end, Georgia rejected the proposed 
Gazprom deal. In response, Russia increased the price per cm [sic] by nearly 500 percent, from 
$50 to $235. 
In January 2006, at the same time, the two gas lines and the primary electrical connection 
between two states were blown up. The electric power grid, an old Soviet one, was another 
vulnerability which the Kremlin decided to exploit. 
In the end, though, Georgia was able to escape from this Russian sanction as well. The 
country is fortunate to have great hydroelectric potential, and the Georgians were able to use that 
as an alternative to supply much of their power in the years after 2006. Indeed, presently, 
Georgia is able to export electricity to Russia. The Georgian government immediately started to 
distance the country from a dependence on Russia. Fortunately, Georgia has a close neighbor and 
partner, Azerbaijan, which has significant gas reserves. Azerbaijan agreed to sell its gas at almost 
its domestic price, i.e., less than half what Russia offered. Starting in 2008, Georgia was able to 
buy its natural gas from Azerbaijan, which greatly helped both states, eliminating Moscow from 
the process (Newnham R. 2015). 
As for electricity, before 2003, power blackouts in Georgia were the norm in daily life. 
Power was supplied to customers only for a few hours per day, and only about 30% of the energy 
used was paid for.  Some villages were entirely cut off from the power for years. In 2003, energy 
was one of the most corrupt sectors in Georgia. The Ministry of Energy itself had no electricity. 
As the result of privatization and a number of other reforms by 2006, the country had 24-hour 
energy, even in remote areas, and the payment rate had reached 96 percent. By 2007, Georgia 
turned in to a net electricity exporter (Gilauri N. 2017) 
Furthermore, Azerbaijan and Georgia are partner transit countries. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline delivers the oil to the Europe; the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline takes the gas. Both 
projects also have vital importance for diversification of Georgian energy strategy (Kakachia K. 
2013). Although before Azerbaijan became the full alternative to the Russian gas partially and 
temporarily, Iran became the partner for Georgia. Negotiations with Iran concerned Georgia’s 
greatest ally the US. US ambassador warned Georgian sight against Iran gas deal. But 
Saakashvili was able to convince Americans about correctness of Georgia’s position (Jerusalem 
Post, 2006) 
The energy issue was developed in parallel of the Russian trade sanctions. In 2006, 
Russia, its largest trading partner, banned trade with Georgia. The precise reason was the arrest 
of Russian spies by the Saakashvili government. Tens of thousands of labor migrants from 
Russia were evicted. In August 2008, five days of full-fledged war killed 228 civilians and 160 
soldiers and increased the size of the occupied territories by 20 percent, displacing 110,000 
people from their homes, more than a third of whom did not return. Georgia was not as 
dependent on Russia, but the share of its exports to Russia fell from 18% in 2005 to 4% in 2007 
while its total exports surged by 42%. Experts believe that escaping Russian economic and 
energy influence helped Mikheil Saakashvili's government to combat corruption in Georgia 
(Aslund 2013). 
Besides fighting corruption, on 6 September 2006, the World Bank announced Georgia as 
the top reformer in its “Doing Business” indexes. With market economy reforms, economic 
indicators started growing significantly. After 2003, GDP growth rates shot up, and in 2007, it 
was a record 12%. Later, in 2009, it fell, partly because of the 2008 war and partly due to the 
global financial crisis. In the following years, the economy of Georgia showed continued and 
gradual growth of about 7% per year (World Bank, 2012). 
The new economic strategy of the Rose Revolution government attracted foreign direct 
investment and stimulated rapid economic growth. Once failed state Georgia turned into a 
dynamic, liberal, open-to-the-global-economy, and tax-haven-for-foreign investors country. At 
the same time, government tax reforms and a campaign against corruption created more 
economic freedom and capacity. Between 2004-2008, Georgia’s GDP grew from 5 billion$ to 
12.8 billion$, and budgetary resources multiplied by more than 2.5 times, allowing Georgia to 
pursue a more assertive foreign policy in Europe and establish greater economic separation from 
Russia. Due to economic growth, Georgia (???) increased the military budget from 71.8 million 
$ in 2004 to 1,087.9 million $ in 2008. There was the rapid modernization of Georgia’s military 
forces and participation in NATO troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Economic reforms not only did 
it bring Europe in, but created an economy robust enough to resist the consequences of a Russian 
economic embargo after 2006, the deportation of Georgian migrants (2004-2006), and an 
invasion in August 2008 (Jones S. Kakhiashvili L. 2013). 
 
 
 
Summery  
 
 
As for the conclusion, the empirical inquiries in this paper allow to say that weak states 
should increase their economic and institutional capacities to prevent dependence on the 
hegemonic superpower. Weak institutions are vulnerable via bribery system before the external 
hegemony. Dominant power can successfully use this pillar during elections, 
in order to keep the energy policy dependent and to control the markets. Thus, corruption is the 
one of the crucial factors for independent foreign policy. Autocratic power easily penetrates 
corrupt, weak neighbors and pushes the country to change its foreign policy. As strong is the 
political and economic dependence on the external power, so high is the probability of altering 
the country's foreign policy, not for the country’s internal political benefits but in favor of the 
external power. 
 Ukraine and Georgia are somehow paradoxical countries. Ukraine is weak, but still, 
democracy, enjoys a much greater level of political freedom than other non-Baltic former Soviet 
countries. But at the same time, Ukraine is the most corrupt country in the post-Soviet space. 
 The paradox of Georgia implies that incommensurately small size of its territory, 
population, and economy, the lack of natural resources, compared to Russia, rationally hardly 
would leave room for confrontation from Georgian side. In order to resist Russian influence, 
Georgia already paid with its territorial integrity. However, it gained independence 
through institutional reforms. 
 Any pro-Western step will always annoy and irritate Russia. Russia does not want to lose 
its authority in the post-Soviet space. Generally, being closer to the West means 
establishing institutional reforms, free market economy and consolidating democracy. Ukraine 
needs to get rid of its reputation as a corrupt country and free its economy. The further 
essential idea for Georgia is to become more democratically consolidated. 
 In the nearest future, hardly anything will change in the politics of Russia. The former 
Soviet hegemony will more likely continue to act according to the Dahlian concept of power and 
to keep forcefully getting from the former colonies that which they would not give otherwise. 
Georgia is a proper example that Ukraine can follow to develop efficient and sustainable reforms 
and eliminate Russian influence. 
 Discussed in this paper are corruption, the political elite, and energy dependence , are 
factors that determine the countries' foreign policy change. The broad domestic political picture 
of Ukraine and Georgia may reveal   other factors of foreign policy change. For instance, the role 
of oligarchs in Ukraine and Georgian Orthodox Church, or the uncertainty of post-Maidan pro-
Western Ukrainian government, and the raising Russian sentiments in Georgia. All of these 
factors may affect the countries' future development and relations with Russia and may be 
relevant for further research.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
          
Table 1.Questions about democracy. Wave 6, 2010-2014 (%) *  
 
Question/country Georgia Ukraine 
Democracy is absolutely 
important 
54.1 35.9 
heaving a democratic 
political system in very good 
46.1 33.4 
demand in strong ruler 23.5 29.2 
Choose leader democratically 
is an essential 
48.2 48.3 
* World Values Survey 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Freedom rating, Ukraine and Georgia 2004-2014 (1=most free, 7=least free)* 
 
*Freedom House, country freedom 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
Figure 1. The rank of corruption by countries, Ukraine and Georgia 2004-2014*  
(0=most clean, 100 and more=the most corrupt) 
 
*By the data of Transparency International corruption ranking index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
 
Figure 1. Export to Russia from Ukraine and Georgia 2004-20014* 
 
* By the data of the World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Import from Russia to Ukraine and Georgia 2004-20014* 
 
* By the data of the World Bank. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 (continue) 
 
Figure 3. GDP growth. Ukraine and Georgia 2004-20014* 
 
* By the data of the World Bank. 
 
 
